

Public Opinion on
National Priority Issues

March 2000

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National Priority Issues

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Findings of a national sample survey conducted in November 1999
by the Group: Democracy and Governance
of the Human Sciences Research Council

Editor
Stephen Rule

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2000

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Executive Summary

1999 was a momentous year in South African democratic history — the second democratic election was held, 96% of the voting population cast a verdict of freeness and fairness of the election during the first exit poll to be conducted in South Africa and public participation and attitudes to democracy saw a marked increase in maturity. The year also saw a marked improvement in public sentiment about government performance, service delivery and economic circumstances. A comparison of the national public opinion surveys of December 1998 and November 1999 reveals that public opinion also softened slightly on the issues of crime and corruption and that levels of trust in the various national institutions increased. There was minimal change in the political preferences, with the ANC retaining its overwhelming popularity amongst the electorate.

More than half (53%) of the adult population expressed satisfaction with the way the country is being governed, as did more than two-fifths in relation to provincial and local governance. Almost half (46%) were satisfied with the general political situation. A year previously, one-third or less had been satisfied with any of these spheres of governance. Provincially, the people of the Eastern Cape were most satisfied with national governance, whereas those of the Free State expressed the greatest satisfaction with local and provincial government. Lowest levels of satisfaction with all spheres of governance were felt in the Western Cape and Gauteng. With regard to dealing with the incidence of corruption in government, only 30% of the population said that the issue was not being sufficiently prioritised.

The top two national priorities that emerged were job creation (41%) and fighting crime (31%). Although these had also been deemed top priorities in 1998, they had reversed positions, crime having been the number one priority in 1998. Job creation was seen to be the top national priority amongst younger people and people with low incomes and in seven of the country's nine provinces. In contrast, the greatest proportions of people in the Western Cape and Gauteng said that fighting crime was the top priority. This was also the sentiment of older people and those in the higher income categories throughout the country. Nearly one in five (19%) people said that they had personally been victims of crime in the preceding 12 months, this proportion being an alarming 39% amongst the white population. Overall, people with monthly incomes of between R4160 and R16659 or aged between 35 and 54 years were more affected than other groups. Whereas nearly one-third (35%) of the population felt that the government had no control over the crime situation, this was the feeling of half or more of the respondents in Gauteng and the Western Cape. Nevertheless, these proportions had decreased since 1998.

There was an increase between 1998 and 1999 in the proportions of the population who felt that the delivery of services at local level had improved since the 1994 election. Between one and two-fifths indicated that the delivery of running water, housing, electricity, health, police services, education and other services had improved. This positive sentiment was the greatest in the Northern Cape in relation to water and housing, the Eastern Cape in relation to health and the Free State in relation to police and public transport services. In contrast between 15% and 32% felt that the delivery of the various services had worsened since 1994.

Asked in which province they would most like to live, the degree of preference for current province of residence was highest in the Western Cape (95%) and lowest in Gauteng (72%). One in twelve (8%) of the population said that they had moved to another home during the preceding 12 months. This tendency was highest amongst residents of the same two provinces, namely the Western Cape (12%) and (Gauteng (11%).

Fifty-four per cent of respondents thought the economic situation of the country had deteriorated over the past year, while 23% thought national circumstances had improved and 17% that these had remained the same. Differences emerged between older and younger segments of the population, the latter more likely to have experienced a deterioration. Whereas only one in five black people indicated that the government's economic policies had affected them negatively, this was the case with one-quarter of the coloured population and half of white and Indian South Africans. The population was divided between those who thought that the government should play a strong role in the economy (49%) and those who felt that market forces should be allowed to dominate (37%), with 14% having no opinion on the topic. People in the highest living standard measurement (LSM) categories were far more likely to favour a free market economy than were those in the lowest categories. Conversely, low LSM groups were significantly more likely than their high LSM counterparts to be willing to pay extra taxes in order to enable the government to improve services that are important to them. Low LSM groups were also more in favour than were high LSM groups of active labour movement and more likely to endorse the preferential recruitment and promotion of members of previously disadvantaged groups in the job market.

Levels of trust in various institutions ranged from highs of 80% with regard to churches and 66% for the media to lows of 39% for political parties and 38% for labour unions. Intermediate levels of trust emerged for the defence force, business, the IEC, provincial and local government, the police and the courts. Half of the population indicated that they attend religious services at least once per week. In this respect no significant differences emerged between different population groups, but women were more likely to be regular churchgoers than were men. Members of other civic organisations, including political parties, trade unions, women's organisations, youth organisations and anti-crime movements declined between 1998 and 1999, to less than one in ten. However, more than seven out of ten still felt that democracy is the best form of government. One-third (36%) of the population said that they had voted for the party they had in June 1999 because they supported the policy of that party and another third (34%) in order to facilitate a better lifestyle. One-fifth (22%) "identified" themselves with the party concerned. The ANC remained first choice amongst 56% of the population, who said they would have voted for this party had an election been held in November 1999. Disregarding those who indicated that they would not vote or who did not reveal any political preference, an election in November 1999 would have yielded a national parliament of very similar composition to that elected in June. The ANC would have emerged with a clear majority (66%), followed by the DP (10%), IFP (8%), NNP (6%), UDM (2%) and ACDP (2%).

Yvonne Muthien
Executive Director
March 2000

Chapter 1

Introduction and methodology

Stephen Rule

The Human Sciences Research Council has conducted regular national surveys of public opinion for several years. Topics that are investigated include views about the quality of governance being exercised in South Africa, satisfaction service delivery, perceived national priorities, political preferences and the economy. Respondents are also asked for their opinions on race relations, the fight against crime and the extent to which they trust various national institutions such as labour unions, the courts, the media and the police. This volume report on the shades of public opinion about these and other issues as captured during the national survey of November 1999. The views thus reflect the public mood just five months after the re-election by a wide margin, of the incumbent national government. Public opinion at this juncture can be used as a barometer of the needs and priorities of the electorate and will be of value to all individuals and organisations that are involved in the public domain. Additionally, questions are received from a range of clients on topics ranging from voting behaviour and energy utilisation to safety and security issues. The latter data are the property of the respective clients and are not reported in this volume, however.

The survey instrument comprised a questionnaire containing 34 pages of questions. It was divided into different topics and the duration of interviews of respondents was between 60 and 90 minutes. A sample of 2 704 respondents was selected throughout South Africa in clusters of eight and situated in 338 census enumerator areas (EAs) as determined in the 1996 census. Each EA was classified in terms of the dominant lifestyle category by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in its analysis of the 1996 census data. In order to ensure adequate representation in the sample from each province and from each of the four dominant population groups, the sample was stratified by province and by lifestyle category. Disproportionately large samples were selected from areas known to be inhabited by the two smallest components of the population, namely (i) areas with dominantly Indian populations and (ii) the Northern Cape.

At 2 672 interviews, the realised sample (Table 1.1) was only slightly less than that intended 2 704 (8 in each of 334 EAs). In terms of province and population group, the spread was sufficiently wide to facilitate statistical generalisations about opinions prevailing within each province and amongst persons of each of the four main population groups (Table 1.2).

Each case was then weighted so that the resultant weighted dataset would approximate the distribution of the population of South Africa in terms of population group and province (Table 1.3).

The demographic characteristics of the weighted sample are listed in a series of tables in Appendix 1. These include home language, income, population group, gender, age and province.

Appendix 2 comprises a list of each enumerator area from which a sample of respondents was drawn for this survey. The dominant lifestyle category of the EA is indicated in each case.

Table 1.1 Nov. 1999 realised survey sample by province and lifestyle category

Lifestyle category*		Province								Total	
		EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW		WC
1	Mpumalanga					17		104			121
2	Eastern Nkosi				192						192
3	African Ngani			96	48	71		8			223
4	Ugogo	16	40				16		8	16	96
5	Miondolas	8	16	48	8	16		8	24	24	152
6	Farmlands	8	64			40	8	8	24		152
7	Miner's Glory	8	16	16	16	24	8	24	26		138
8	Yokel		16	32	16	8		16	24	8	120
9	No-person's land		8	8				8			24
10	Merino	8					48			24	80
11	Periphery	8		8			40			40	96
12	South Wester	8		8		8	16			40	80
13	Rainbow Crescent			8						24	32
14	Eastern Mosaic			80	136	8				24	248
15	Golden Ages	8								8	16
16	Skyscrapers	8		24	8		8			8	56
17	Hostelry			8			8				16
18	Holdings	16	32	25		24	40	16		24	177
19	Jongens	8	16	39		16	16	8	16	16	135
20	Highbrow	8		40	32					24	104
21	Kei	168									168
22	Elfin		32				32	48	126		238
23	Northlands					8					8
Total		280	248	448	456	248	248	248	248	280	2 672

* Each EA used in the 1996 census was classified according to factors such as dominant income group, language, population group, housing type and urban or ruralness.

Table 1.2: Unweighted sample realisation by province and population, group, Nov. 1999

Population group	Province								Total n	%	
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW			WC
Black	214	214	206	316	201	82	209	216	65	1723	64,5
White	37	20	129	15	22	38	34	13	62	370	13,9
Coloured	29	6	49	4	8	118	5	19	134	372	13,9
Indian	0	0	56	121	9	2	0	0	19	207	7,8
Total	280	240	440	456	240	240	248	248	280	2 672	100,1
Percentage	10,5	9,0	16,5	17,1	9,0	9,0	9,0	9,3	10,5	99,9	


Table 1.3: Weighted sample percentage by province and population group, Nov. 1999

Population group	Province								Total %	
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW		WC
Black	11,5	5,8	15,0	15,1	5,8	0,7	9,7	7,8	2,4	73,7
White	0,9	0,8	5,3	1,4	0,7	0,4	0,4	0,6	3,0	13,5
Coloured	1,3	0,1	0,7	0,2	0,1	1,0	0,1	0,2	5,9	9,6
Indian	0,0	0,0	0,5	2,3	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,2	3,2
Total	13,7	6,7	21,5	19,0	6,8	2,1	10,2	8,6	11,5	100,0

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Figure 1: Public opinion survey



Chapter 2

Governance and corruption

Gregory Houston

This chapter focuses on levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with governance, as well as people's perceptions of the government's commitment to ensuring clean and honest government. The most significant variables in these areas are province, population group, ethno-linguistic group and income, with other variables such as gender and age providing limited insight.

2.1 Satisfaction with the government

Each respondent was asked how satisfied she/he was with the general political situation in South Africa as well as with the way her/his local area, province and country were being governed. Table 2.1 summarises levels of dissatisfaction in November 1999 with these different dimensions of the polity in each province. The percentages are the totals of those indicating that they are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the dimension of governance specified in each case. It would have to be of concern to the government that in excess of half of its electorate were satisfied neither with the general political situation in the country nor with the way in which the country is being governed at any of the three spheres of government. Overall, satisfaction with governance at all levels were marginally higher than dissatisfaction. Satisfaction with the general political situation and with national governance in relation to dissatisfaction was higher than the relative figures for governance at the local and provincial levels. Thus, while 10% and 19% more respondents were satisfied than dissatisfied with governance in the former dimensions respectively, only 1% and 6% were more satisfied than dissatisfied with local and provincial governance respectively. The geographical variations in the extent of this satisfaction give some indication of which provinces were perceived to be enjoying better governance than were others. The Western Cape was the only province in which more respondents were dissatisfied than satisfied with governance at all levels. More respondents in all the other provinces were satisfied with the general political situation and with national governance than dissatisfied. Together with the Western Cape, there was more dissatisfaction than satisfaction with local governance among respondents in the Eastern Cape and the Northern Province. Similarly, more respondents in the Western Cape, Mpumalanga, and the Northern Province were dissatisfied than satisfied with provincial governance.

What is particularly significant, however, has been the change in levels of satisfaction with the government since December 1998. There has been a marked increase in satisfaction with governance at all levels since 1998, with a corresponding decrease in levels of dissatisfaction. For instance, satisfaction with the general political situation increased from 31% in 1998 to 46% in 1999, while dissatisfaction dropped from 55% in 1998 to 36% in 1999. Similarly, satisfaction with national governance rose from 37% to 53%, while dissatisfaction dropped from 50% to 32% in the same period (Tables 2.2 and 2.3). Levels of satisfaction with the general political situation rose dramatically in virtually all the provinces, with the exception of the Western Cape, which retained relatively low levels of satisfaction (31 %) in 1999, the Free State and North West (which both retained relatively high levels of

Table 2.1: Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by province, Nov. 1999 (percentages)

Governance	Satisfaction level	Province									RSA
		EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
General political situation	Dissatisfied	32	28	37	39	25	30	40	29	48	36
	Satisfied	58	48	39	49	52	56	44	51	31	46
Local area governance	Dissatisfied	49	40	36	37	44	41	51	40	51	42
	Satisfied	43	47	42	49	48	43	40	46	31	43
Provincial governance	Dissatisfied	39	29	33	38	41	26	47	33	47	38
	Satisfied	48	56	40	49	40	57	44	50	26	44
National governance	Dissatisfied	25	25	39	36	24	29	25	25	45	32
	Satisfied	66	59	42	51	66	59	63	58	30	53

satisfaction). Since 1998, dissatisfaction with local government has increased in the Western Cape only. In addition, the Western Cape is the only province in which less respondents felt satisfied with local government in 1999 (26%) than respondents in 1998 (27%). Nevertheless, the level of dissatisfaction with governance dropped for all spheres of government in every province in the country.

Perhaps one of the most significant factors that accounted for the change in levels of satisfaction is the difference in the economic outlook between December 1998 and November 1999. The effects of the East Asian crisis were sharply felt in late 1998, with an increase in interest rates from 17,5% to 25% directly impinging on virtually all South Africans. In November 1999, interest rates had fallen to 15,5%, and the general economic outlook appeared to be much better. This aspect is further explored in Chapter 5. In addition, political disagreement in late 1998 over the forthcoming election, in particular the disagreements over voter registration, the use of identity documents, differences between the government and the Independent Electoral Commission, may have played a crucial role in promoting pessimism with the country at the time. The Western Cape is one province that does not normally follow national trends, largely because of the specific social and economic conditions in the area and political traditions. These include the relatively small number of blacks living in the Western Cape, the numerical and social domination of the coloured people, and a conservative political history. Although levels of satisfaction have risen with a corresponding drop in levels of dissatisfaction, particularly with regard to the general political situation and national governance, this province still has relatively high levels of dissatisfaction. However, dissatisfaction has shifted largely from the national arena to the local and provincial levels of governance. Among the main reasons for this are the high crime rate and the rise in urban terrorism, particularly in Cape Town, as well as a generally positive economic outlook at the end of 1999.

As with other indicators, there is a racial dimension to the levels of satisfaction with different spheres of governance. White and Indian respondents expressed considerably higher levels of dissatisfaction than did coloureds and especially blacks, in 1999 for whom dissatisfaction was lower than for any of the other groups. Nevertheless, coloureds as well as whites and Indians, were generally more dissatisfied than satisfied with governance at all levels. By contrast, more blacks were satisfied than dissatisfied with governance at all three levels. However, considerable proportions of blacks were dissatisfied with local (39%) and provincial (32%) governance (Table 2,3). While blacks and coloureds were most dissatisfied with local government, Indians (74%) and whites (72%) were most dissatisfied with national governance, in addition to having generally high levels of dissatisfaction with the other areas of governance.

Table 2.2: Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by province, December 1998 (percentages)

Governance	Satisfaction level	Province									RSA
		EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
General political situation	Dissatisfied	55	45	50	63	48	54	59	39	59	55
	Satisfied	28	44	37	23	40	19	28	46	23	31
Local area governance	Dissatisfied	57	54	53	53	51	61	73	38	49	55
	Satisfied	30	34	34	32	39	20	15	48	32	31
Provincial governance	Dissatisfied	60	43	48	57	50	46	69	34	49	53
	Satisfied	27	46	38	26	40	23	22	50	27	32
National governance	Dissatisfied	47	35	48	55	44	52	56	30	57	50
	Satisfied	41	53	40	30	46	23	29	59	27	37




Table 2.3: Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by population group, November 1999 (percentages)

Governance	Satisfaction level	Population group				Total
		Black	White	Coloured	Indian	
General political situation	Dissatisfied	27	69	47	70	36
	Satisfied	55	15	30	15	46
Local area governance	Dissatisfied	39	53	49	60	42
	Satisfied	47	32	31	25	43
Provincial governance	Dissatisfied	32	60	44	71	38
	Satisfied	53	15	31	14	44
National governance	Dissatisfied	22	72	41	74	32
	Satisfied	64	11	32	14	53

As with the provincial indicators, the year-by-year change shows an increase in levels of satisfaction with governance among all population groups between 1998 and 1999 and a corresponding drop in levels of dissatisfaction during the same period: The level of satisfaction with the general political situation has risen by 14% for blacks, 9% for coloureds, 2% for Indians and 8% for whites, while the level of dissatisfaction has decreased by 14%, 11%, 12%, and 15% for blacks, coloureds, Indians and whites respectively. However, the level of satisfaction with governance in all dimensions has increased less markedly for Indians than for any other population group, including whites. The level of satisfaction has increased most dramatically amongst blacks.

Table 2.4: Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by population group, December 1998 (percentages)

Governance	Satisfaction level	Population group				Total
		Black	White	Coloured	Indian	
General political situation	Dissatisfied	44	84	58	82	55
	Satisfied	41	7	21	13	31
Local area governance	Dissatisfied	54	54	54	72	55
	Satisfied	34	26	26	21	31
Provincial governance	Dissatisfied	48	70	52	77	53
	Satisfied	40	13	18	15	32
National governance	Dissatisfied	36	87	54	82	50
	Satisfied	49	6	22	14	37

Although all the black ethno-linguistic groups in the November 1999 survey are generally more satisfied than dissatisfied with governance at all levels, there are clear variations in levels of satisfaction. Black isiXhosa speakers are more satisfied with the general political situation (61%) and national governance (70%) than are blacks that speak other languages. However, less isiXhosa-speaking blacks, most of whom live in the Eastern Cape, are satisfied with provincial government than are isiZulu-speaking and Sotho-speaking (Sesotho, Setswana, Sepedi) black groups. White Afrikaners are generally more dissatisfied with the general political situation (71%) and provincial (61%) and national governance (78%) than are whites that speak other languages (67%, 57% and 63% respectively). The latter, despite being more dissatisfied with local governance than Afrikaans-speaking whites, are generally more satisfied with governance at all levels than Afrikaans-speaking whites (Table 2.5).

Table 2.5: Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by ethno-linguistic group, November 1999 (percentages)

Governance	Satisfaction level	Ethno-linguistic group								RSA
		Black Zulu	Black Sotho group	Black Xhosa	Black other	Coloured	White Afrik.	White other	Indian	
General political situation	Dissatisfied	30	25	24	28	47	71	67	70	36
	Satisfied	56	52	61	51	30	11	30	15	46
Local area governance	Dissatisfied	35	37	33	41	49	52	56	60	42
	Satisfied	51	45	47	46	31	31	34	25	43
Provincial governance	Dissatisfied	31	25	34	37	44	61	57	71	38
	Satisfied	56	57	51	47	31	15	16	14	44
National governance	Dissatisfied	26	26	20	21	41	78	63	74	32
	Satisfied	60	64	70	62	32	8	16	14	53

The level of satisfaction with governance in South Africa decreases as we move up the income ladder. However, unlike the situation with population group, there is a higher level of satisfaction with governance among the high-income groups than among white respondents. This is probably due to the increasing number of black, coloured and Indian people who are earning high salaries. Nevertheless, whites still dominate the high-earning income groups. The significance of this variable, however, lies in the fact that most people in the high-earning groups are skilled, and their level of dissatisfaction with governance is inordinately high. By contrast, respondents from the low-income groups are much more satisfied with governance in South Africa.

Table 2.6: Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by income, November 1999 (percentages)

Governance	Satisfaction level	Income									RSA
		No income	R1-R249	R250-R579	R580-R1249	R1250-R2499	R2500-R4159	R4160-R8329	R8330-R16659	R16660+	
General political situation	Dissatisfied	37	27	24	29	34	68	63	53	64	36
	Satisfied	48	59	53	52	44	19	24	33	36	46
Local area governance	Dissatisfied	46	43	30	40	42	61	44	63	51	42
	Satisfied	43	45	52	40	41	23	34	29	47	43
Provincial governance	Dissatisfied	39	34	25	36	40	63	63	55	65	38
	Satisfied	47	56	54	44	36	15	24	25	35	44
National governance	Dissatisfied	33	22	19	26	35	61	62	59	51	32
	Satisfied	52	69	63	60	50	20	23	19	49	53

2.2 Government corruption

Respondents during the 1999 survey were asked whether the government is giving sufficient priority to ensuring clean and honest government. Most of the respondents (34%) felt that the government was placing sufficient priority on ensuring clean and honest government. However, just under a third (30%) of South Africans feel that the government is not doing

enough about corruption. Large proportions of respondents in the Western Cape (48%) and Gauteng (43%) felt that the government was not giving enough attention to corruption, while most respondents in the other provinces felt the government was giving sufficient priority to ensuring clean and honest government. In particular, respondents in the Eastern Cape (44%), Free State (42%) and KwaZulu-Natal (42%) felt that the government was paying sufficient attention to corruption (Table 2.7).

Table 2.7: Priority given to ensuring clean conduct by public officials by province, November 1999 (percentages)

Anti-corruption priority	Province									Total RSA
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
Too high priority	21	9	12	15	24	12	29	15	16	17
Sufficient priority	44	42	29	42	35	26	27	38	21	34
Too low priority	23	28	43	28	22	22	14	20	48	30
Uncertain/don't know	12	21	16	15	19	40	30	27	15	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

More respondents felt that the government was placing sufficient priority on ensuring clean and honest government in 1999 (34%) than did respondents in 1998 (29%). Similarly, the proportion of respondents who felt that the government was placing too high a priority on ensuring clean government increased from 13% in 1998 to 17% in 1999. Together these figures demonstrate a feeling among most respondents (51%) in 1999 that the government was doing something to attack corruption. By contrast, only 42% of respondents in 1998 felt that the government was either doing sufficiently or too much to tackle corruption. These can be compared with a decline in the proportion of respondents who felt that the government was placing too low a priority on corruption from 44% in 1998 to 30% in 1999.

Marked differences exist in the way this issue was perceived by the different population groups in the November 1999 survey. Most coloureds, Indians and whites felt that the government was placing too low a priority on dealing with corruption. This was particularly the case with white respondents, with 72% feeling this way. Black respondents were the only group amongst whom there were more respondents (40%) who felt that the government was giving sufficient priority to ensuring clean and honest government. Equal numbers of black respondents (20%) felt that the government was placing too high a priority on dealing with corruption, or placing too low a priority. Similar proportions of coloured (10%) and Indian (11%) respondents felt that the government was placing too high a priority on dealing with corruption, while only 5% of whites felt this way (Table 2.9).

Table 2.8: Priority given to ensuring clean conduct by public officials by province, December 1998 (percentages)

Anti-corruption priority	Province									Total RSA
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
Too high priority	13	13	18	7	10	7	9	32	6	13
Sufficient priority	28	33	27	47	22	8	20	30	18	29
Too low priority	43	40	47	41	44	60	52	24	48	44
Uncertain/don't know	16	14	8	5	24	25	19	14	28	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

A comparison of responses in December 1998 and November 1999 indicated a general increase in the proportion of respondents amongst all population groups who feel that government was placing too high a priority on ensuring clean and honest government. This was particularly so among coloureds and Indians, with 5% more respondents in both groups feeling this way. This may largely have arisen from a feeling among some people in these groups that there are other more important issues that require greater attention. Less Indian respondents felt that the government was placing sufficient priority on ensuring clean government in 1999 than respondents in 1998. However, more respondents from the other groups felt this way in 1999. There was a general decrease in the proportion of respondents from all population groups who felt that the government was placing too low a priority on corruption between 1998 and 1999. This suggested that more people felt that the government was attempting to deal with corruption in 1999 than felt this way in 1998 (Tables 2.9 and 2.10).

Table 2.9: Priority given to ensuring clean conduct by public officials by Population group, November 1999 (percentages)

Anti-corruption priority	Population group				Total
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	
Too high priority	20	5	10	11	17
Sufficient priority	40	13	26	23	34
Too low priority	20	72	43	58	30
Uncertain/don't know	20	10	21	8	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100

One factor that may account for this is the manner in which the government has dealt with senior public officials who have been implicated with corruption and maladministration during 1999. The well-publicised resignations of a number of these officials may well have influenced people's perceptions of the commitment of the government to ensuring clean and honest government. On the other hand, the wellpublicised disagreements between certain senior government officials and the Heath Commission, including the government's attacks on the Commission's budgetary requests and claims of performance, may have raised suspicions about the government's commitment to dealing with corruption.

Table 2.10: Priority given to ensuring clean conduct by public officials by Population group, December 1998 (percentages)

Anti-corruption priority	Population group				Total
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	
Too high priority	17	3	5	6	13
Sufficient priority	37	8	17	27	29
Too low priority	33	77	48	64	44
Uncertain/don't know	13	12	30	3	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100

A larger proportion of the respondents during the November 1999 survey in the black ethno-linguistic groups felt that the government is placing too high a priority on ensuring clean and honest government than the respondents in any other ethno-linguistic group. More respondents in these groups also felt that the government is placing sufficient priority in its

actions on corruption than respondents in the other groups. However, almost a quarter (23%) of isiXhosa-speaking blacks felt that the government is placing too high a priority on corruption, while 45% of this group felt that the government is paying sufficient attention to corruption. Although most whites felt that the government is placing too low a priority on ensuring clean and honest government, this is felt most keenly by non-Afrikaans-speaking whites. While just over one-tenth (11%) of non-Afrikaans-speaking whites felt that the government is placing sufficient attention on corruption, 15% of Afrikaans-speaking whites felt this way. By contrast, the overwhelming majority (78%) of non-Afrikaans-speaking whites felt that the government was placing too low a priority on ensuring clean and honest government, compared to 68% of Afrikaans-speaking whites who felt this way (Table 2.11).

Table 2.11 Priority given to ensuring clean conduct by public officials by ethno-linguistic group, November 1999 (percentages)

Priority	Ethno-linguistic group								Total
	Black Zulu	Black Sotho group	Black Xhosa	Black other	Coloured	White Afrik.	White other	Indian	
Too high priority	18	16	23	23	10	5	6	11	17
Sufficient priority	38	41	45	35	26	15	11	23	34
Too low priority	26	20	16	18	43	68	78	58	30
Uncertain/don't know	18	23	16	24	21	12	5	8	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 2.12 Priority given to ensuring clean conduct by public officials by income category, November 1999 (percentages)

Anti-corruption priority	Income									Total
	No income	R1-R249	R250-R579	R580-R1249	R1250-R2499	R2500-R4159	R4160-R8329	R8330-R16659	R16660-R41660+	
Too high priority	18	18	19	12	18	21	6	5	13	17
Sufficient priority	36	41	38	35	32	27	21	16	25	34
Too low priority	29	18	17	33	34	38	71	77	62	30
Uncertain/don't know	17	23	26	20	16	14	2	2		19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The level of satisfaction with the priority given by the government to ensuring clean and honest government was relatively high for the lower income groups, and it decreased progressively for the higher income groups during the November 1999 survey. For the higher income groups, the government was seen to be placing too low a priority on efforts to deal with corruption. Thus, more than three-quarters of the respondents in some income groups (71% and 77%) felt that there was a need for the government to place more emphasis on efforts to handle corruption in the public service (Table 2.12).

Chapter 3

National priorities

Victor Ramaema

3.1 Things that need to be changed by the government

This section covers findings about what respondents thought the priorities for South Africa should be. Table 3.1 outlines the results of the request to respondents to mention "three things" that they would ask the government to change in order to make life better for people like themselves.

Table 3.1 Priorities for change (November 1999)

Item needing change	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total % RSA
Job creation	68	31	60	48	62
Crime reduction	40	67	49	79	46
Housing provision	34	9	27	12	30
Improve education	15	20	20	21	17
Clean source of water & bringing cost down	19	1	3	0.6	14
Improve clinics and better health services	11	15	8	6	11
Better services: water and electricity	10	5	4	3	9
Electricity supply and street lights	10	1	3	1	8
Increase money for pensioners	5	7	10	4	6
Better wages and/or salary increment	5	4	8	4	5

Although there are a number of "things" that respondents thought that the government needed to change, three were mentioned most frequently: Job creation/opportunities topped the list with 62%, followed by the need to reduce crime and/or intensify police patrols (46%) and provision of housing (30%) (Table 3.1).

Comparing these findings with the December 1998 survey, some slight differences may be observed. For example, the December 1998 survey had employment (56%), crime (44%) and provision of services¹ (28%) as three most frequently mentioned things that needed change by the government. Provision of housing ranked jointly fourth with education, with 26% of respondents indicating that each needed change. In the November 1999 survey, provision of housing was the third most frequently mentioned item with 30% of respondents indicating that it needed change. On the other hand, 17% of the respondents indicated education as one sphere that also needed attention by the government.

When analysing the four items by population group in November 1999 interesting variations are evident. For example, where 68% blacks and 60% coloureds felt that job creation or opportunities should be changed, Indians (79%) and whites (67%) were more concerned about crime (Table 3.1). This pattern was similar to the findings of the December 1998 survey which found that both blacks and coloureds perceived most frequently employment creation as in need of change, whilst Indians and whites most frequently

¹ Services such as water, telephones, roads and electricity supply.

mentioned crime. Another interesting finding in November 1999 was the relatively low proportion of Indians (12%) and whites (9%) who saw a need for housing provision (Table 3.1). The concern of whites and Indians over crime may be ascribed to the fact that they are perceived as affluent and hence likely to be targeted. For example, with proportionately higher levels of stable employment both whites and Indians were arguably more concerned about protecting their property and assets than looking for jobs.

An increase is observed when the November 1999 results are compared with the findings of the December 1998 national survey. The 1998 survey, for example had job creation as the most frequently mentioned item that needed change among 66% blacks, followed by coloureds (56%). In addition, whilst whites (79%), Indians (64%), and coloureds (50%) frequently mentioned crime reduction as needing change, only blacks registered a relatively low percentage (32%).

With regard to the above discussion, the following conclusions are made relating to the November 1999 national survey:

- (1) Both black (68%) and coloured (60%) respondents mentioned most frequently the creation of more jobs and/or job opportunities as being in need of change.
- (2) Large proportions of whites (67%) and Indians (79%) felt that crime reduction and/or more safe and security was most critical.
- (3) Regarding provision of housing, this was seen as needing change by fewer white respondents (9%) and Indians (12%) in comparison with both blacks (34%) and coloureds (27%).
- (4) As far as education is concerned, 17% of all respondents indicated a need to change or improve education. Although blacks (15%) were the lowest, there were no significant differences observed when analysing this item by population group.

As indicated in Table 3.1 (Nov. 1999), after the above four items that were most frequently mentioned as in need of change, the supply of more water (14%) was next in importance. Almost one-fifth (19%) blacks (a much higher proportion than other groups) perceived the supply of more, and clean sources of water, and the reduction of its cost as in need of change. Similarly, the provision of better services, for example water and electricity and the supply of electricity and street lights was much more likely to be mentioned by blacks (10%) than the other groups (1 to 5%).

Over 50% of the respondents in each province (Table 3.2, Nov. 1999) indicated job creation as the main thing needing change. A noteworthy variation here was KwaZulu-Natal, where almost three-quarters of the respondents (74%) indicated job creation as the main thing that needed change. Regarding concern over crime, respondents in both Gauteng and Western Cape registered much higher percentages, 58% and 53% respectively than did those in other provinces. The Free State had the highest proportion of respondents (46%) who indicated provision of houses as needing change. Supply of more and clean sources of water and bringing down its costs was most commonly mentioned in both KwaZulu-Natal (28%) and the Northern Province (34%) as an item in need of change by the government in order to make life better. This could be ascribed to the relatively low levels of development in the two provinces. Northern Province registered the highest proportion of respondents (25%) indicating the supply of electricity and streetlights as in need of change by the government.

Table 3.2: Things that need to be changed by province (November 1999)

Items needing change	EC	FS	GP	KN	MP	NC	NP	NC	WC	Total %
Job creation	59	62	61	74	62	58	59	62	52	62
Crime reduction	37	40	58	45	43	32	35	40	53	46
Housing provision	21	46	34	26	33	30	21	34	29	30
Supply water & bringing cost down	21	3	2	28	9	8	34	14	3	14
Better services: water, electricity	14	13	4	7	10	7	14	11	4	9
Improve education	15	20	20	13	19	10	11	13	22	17
Supply electricity and street lights	10	4	2	12	3	10	25	8	1	8

A similar pattern was evident (in Nov. 1999) when analysis is done by gross personal income of the respondents (Table 3.3). The overwhelming majority of respondents drawn from those who have no income and among the lowest gross personal income level earners understandably perceived the creation of jobs and/or job opportunities as the most important thing that the government needed to change. On the other hand, the highest gross income level earners showed almost unanimous (99%) concern over crime.

A similar tendency could also be observed with regard to provision of houses, supply of more, and clean sources of water and bringing costs down, and on education items. Larger proportions of low gross income earners indicated concern about housing or the provision of clean sources of water and bringing down its costs than did higher income earners. Respondents with high gross income levels in contrast, showed more concern over the improvement of education as needing a change. Although the present South African constitution entrenches the right to receive education and makes education accessible, there is clearly no equity in this field. For instance, affluent families are more likely to send their children to “expensive” schools, whilst this will be difficult for respondents with low incomes.

Table 3.3: Things that need to be changed by gross personal income (November 1999)

Items needing change	None	R1 to R249	R250 to R579	R580 to R1249	R1250 to R2499	R2500 to R4159	R4160 to R8329	R8330 to R16659	R16660 and more	Total %
Job creation	70	73	59	61	56	39	35	31	13	62
Crime reduction	42	34	41	47	56	62	59	65	99	46
Housing provision	28	41	36	40	28	12	10	10	13	30
Improve education	19	10	13	10	18	15	24	23	38	17
Supply water and bring cost down	17	15	21	8	4	5	0	0	0	14

3.2 The government’s priorities in the next ten years

In a follow-up question, respondents were asked to indicate more specifically what they thought should be the government’s priorities for the next ten years. In a list of priorities provided, respondents were asked to indicate the priorities they considered most important and second most important. Job creation was indicated as the top priority (41%) followed by crime reduction in the second place (31%) (Table 3.4, Nov. 1999). Differences of opinion become evident regarding the third most frequently mentioned priority in comparison with

the previous question. For example, whereas provision of housing was the third most frequently mentioned item that respondents thought needed a change by the government, provision of services was the third most frequently mentioned national priority (7%).

The above findings on respondents' indication of the most important national priorities differs from the December 1998 survey. According to the 1998 survey, respondents indicated crime reduction (41%) as the top national priority, followed by job creation (32%). Provision of better services ranked jointly third with a need to have more influence in government decisions with 8% of respondents indicating each as national priority.

By the time of the subsequent March 1999 survey, however, the reversal had already occurred. Job creation was the top priority amongst 41% of the population in March 1999, as was fighting crime amongst 32%.

Table 3.4: Priorities considered most and second most important (November 1999)

Most important priority	%	Second most important priority	%
Job creation	41	Job creation	27
Crime reduction	31	Crime reduction	19
Better services	7	Better services	12
Improve education	6	Improve education	12
Keep prices down	4	Keep prices down	11
Provide housing	6	Provide housing	14

In a list of priorities considered the second most important (Table 3.4, Nov. 1999), creation of more jobs and fighting crime were once again still regarded as top priorities by 27% and 19% respectively. Housing provision was third with 14% as the second most important national priority in the next ten years. A different pattern is evident when comparing these findings to the December 1998 figures. For example, in the December 1998 survey job creation (24%), crime reduction jointly with education (18%), and keeping prices low were considered the second most important priorities. Provision of better services (14%) was considered the fourth, placed second most important national priority in the 1998 survey.

3.2.1 The most important priority by population group

Fighting crime was considered as the top priority among whites (62%) and Indians (44%) compared to black and coloured respondents who perceived job creation to be the highest priority at 46% and 38% respectively (Table 3.5, Nov. 1999). In the December 1998 survey, a high proportion of white respondents already perceived fighting crime as most critical followed by Indians and coloureds, whilst blacks were more concerned about job creation. Provision of better services was considered the third most important priority by blacks (9%), and coloureds (8%) perceived education and provision of housing as the third most important priority in Nov. 1999 (Table 3.5). Indians (10%) and whites (8%) considered education as the third most important priority. Another noteworthy tendency was that provision of housing was still regarded as the most important priority among both black and coloured respondents, at 7% and 8% respectively.




Table 3.5: The most important priority by population group (November 1999)

Most important priority	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total %
Job creation	46	18	38	31	41
Crime reduction	24	62	34	44	31
Better services	9	0	5	1	7
Improve education	6	8	8	10	6
Keep prices low	3	4	5	8	4
Provide housing	7	1	8	1	6

Another priority was that of keeping prices low. Whereas providing better services was the third most important priority among blacks (9%), there were larger proportions of Indians and whites who considered keeping prices low as more important than service provision (Table 3.5, Nov. 1999). This is slightly different from the December 1998 survey. Whereas provision of better services was in 1998 perceived as the third most important priority among both black and coloured respondents (10%), education fell into this category among Indian respondents (13%), and whites (7%) considered more influence in government decisions as third national priority.

Job creation was still considered the second most important priority by both black and coloured respondents, at 27% and 24% respectively (Table 3.6, Nov. 1999). On the other hand, 29% whites felt that job creation should be the second most important priority whilst Indians (28%) considered improvement of education as such. In the December 1998 survey, job creation was considered the second most important priority among blacks and whites, whilst coloureds and Indians prioritised keeping prices low.

Table 3.6: The second most important priority by population group (November 1999)

Most important priority	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total %
Job creation	27	29	24	19	27
Crime reduction	19	18	21	22	19
Better services	15	4	6	3	12
Improve education	10	14	15	28	12
Keep prices low	8	19	17	16	11
Provide housing	16	6	14	4	14

3.2.2 The most important priority by age

There were some interesting findings evident when analysing by the ages of the respondents (Table 3.7). For example, whereas respondents among the age group of 45 years and over were almost equally divided between those who prioritised fighting crime, and those who prioritised, job creation, larger proportions of the younger age groups considered the creation of more jobs as a top priority. Young people are still at the beginning of their life experience, and finding jobs would be a positive step towards a secure future. On the other hand, older people may have the desire for a secure environment after years of hard work. It is also important to note that there was no significant difference of opinion in terms of age groups when looking at the items of fighting crime and creation of jobs as the second most important national priority.

Table 3.7: The most important priority by age group (November 1999)

Most important priority	18-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55+ years	Total %
Job creation	43	47	43	40	34	41
Crime reduction	28	29	27	40	32	31
Better services	6	6	6	5	11	7
Improve education	9	6	8	2	5	6
Provide housing	4	5	10	6	6	6

The above results differ from the findings of the December 1998 survey. At that time, there were no significant differences regarding the prioritisation of crime and job creation by age groups. Relatively high proportions of respondents across all age groups indicated crime as their main concern, followed by job creation.

3.2.3 The most important priority by gross personal income

Analysing the most important priority by gross personal income gave more or less the same results as the previous section on things that needed to be changed by the government. For example, job creation, fighting crime and housing were the three priorities considered most important by respondents. Secondly, low-income level earners were more concerned about employment creation and higher-income level earners, about fighting crime (Table 3.8).

Table 3.8: The most important priority by gross personal income (November 1999)

Items needing change	None	R1 to R249	R250 to R579	R580 to R1249	R1250 to 2499	R2500 to R4159	R4160 to R8329	R8330 to R16659	R16660 and more
Job creation	46	52	38	44	39	19	33	15	9
Crime prevention	27	16	27	29	36	60	43	66	76
Housing provision	5	14	6	8	3	8	2	-	-
Improve education	7	5	3	3	9	0	14	9	-
Better services	7	9	14	6	3	5	0	-	-

3.2.4 The most important priority by province

In order to determine the spatial variation of priorities considered the most and/or second most important priority the responses to the question were cross-tabulated by province (Table 3.9, Nov. 1999). The Western Cape (43%) and Gauteng (41%) had higher proportions of respondents who indicated fighting crime as the top priority than did the other provinces. These two provinces are the wealthiest and hence their economic position may attract people who are likely to be involved in criminal activities. In addition, whilst Gauteng is generally a focus of crime syndicates, the growing tension and confrontation, for example between alleged drug dealers and PAGAD in the Western Cape could be an explanatory factor for the high proportions of respondents who cited crime reduction as a major national priority.

Comparing these findings to the December 1998 survey, interesting differences may be observed. For example, although Gauteng (44%) already considered crime reduction as a top priority, a higher proportion of people in the Northern Cape (48%) also indicated crime as a top priority than was the case in the other provinces.

Whereas the highest prioritisation of job creation occurred in both the North West (36%) and KwaZulu-Natal (34%) in December 1998, the November 1999 study showed that respondents in KwaZulu-Natal (56%) were still most likely to have this concern. The Eastern Cape (45%) and Free State (40%) followed KwaZulu-Natal in citing job creation as their priority. In addition, Free State also had the highest proportion of respondents who considered the provision of housing (14%) as a priority. In the December 1998 survey, the Northern Province (16%) had the highest proportion of respondents who prioritised the provision of better services.

Table 3.9: The most important priority by province (November 1999)

Items needing change	EC	FS	GP	KN	NW	NC	NP	MP	WC	Total %
Job creation	45	40	39	56	36	38	39	34	30	41
Crime reduction	24	18	41	24	27	32	26	31	43	31
Provide housing	4	14	4	2	7	7	9	5	8	6
Keep prices low	5	2	2	4	1	5	4	7	4	4
Provide better services	12	9	1	6	10	9	16	9	2	7
Improve education	3	12	6	4	9	6	5	12	9	6

Finally, it is noteworthy that fighting crime was identified as the second most important priority by significant proportions of respondents in seven of the nine provinces in the November 1999 survey.

Chapter 4

Service delivery perceptions during Mandela rule, 1994-1999

Meshack Khosa

4.1 Introduction

The aim in this section of the report is to analyse perceptions of infrastructure and service delivery since 1994 by comparing two Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) surveys of public attitudes, conducted between December 1998 and November 1999. Questions addressed are to what extent are services provided improving or worsening? Who are the beneficiaries of these services and where do they live? Before providing analysis of service delivery perceptions, the public's perceptions of what government should focus on is discussed, so are the importance of services at local area.

4.2 Important services at local area level

As indicated in Chapter 3, the top national priorities were job creation (41%) and fighting crime (31 %). In another question in the November 1999 survey, respondents were asked which services they considered the most important in their local areas. More than one in four (27%) mentioned the provision of running water. Affordable housing was the top priority for 17% of the respondents, as was health care for 16%, and electricity for 11%. Education was ranked the most important service by 14% of the respondents, after running water, affordable housing and health care delivery.

Respondents nevertheless ranked the provision of local police services sixth among the government's service priorities, and they gave a low score to the current performance of their local police service. This suggests that South Africans believe that bolstering the provision of local police services is a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition to fight crime.

Other service priorities included tarred roads, recreational facilities and libraries (see Table 4.1). The trends did not change significantly between December 1998 and November 1999. The only major change was in relation to perceptions by Indians, which dropped from 28% to 10% on the provision of affordable housing. The other significant change was the inclusion of education as a separate item in the November 1999 HSRC survey. The majority of Indians (37%) followed by whites (22%), with only 11% of blacks identifying education as an important service.

Perceptions of importance attached to services differ by population group, province and income. For example, running water was the most important service rated by blacks, coloureds and whites, the November 1999 HSRC survey concluded. It was only among Indians that education was as rated the first most important service. Whereas among white respondents, education was seen as the second most important service, among blacks, education came fourth on the list of priorities (together with electricity). These findings indicate that although black students experience the highest failure rate at matric level, the gravity of the education crisis has not yet galvanised the general public.

Table 4.1: ‘If you had to pick, which of the following kinds of services would you say is the most important to you?’

Service	Black %		White %		Coloured %		Indian %		Total sample %	
	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999
Running water	30	28	26	25	19	25	16	17	27	27
Affordable housing	20	18	14	11	25	20	28	10	20	17
Electricity	18	11	20	9	3	7	10	9	16	11
Health care	13	15	22	21	25	14	18	18	16	16
Local police services	4	3	14	6	6	4	15	3	6	4
Education*	-	11	-	22	-	17	-	37	-	14
Tarred roads	5	5	2	2	9	2	4	1	4	4

* Indicates first inclusion in November 1999.
Source: HSRC, Nov. 199

Important shifts in perceptions have also been noticed between December 1998 and November 1999. Among whites and Indians, proportions of respondents who rated police services as important have decreased substantially, these mainly to seeing education as one of the most important services. Among whites and Indians, proportions that pointed out education as the most important service were relatively high, at 22% and 37% respectively.

Table 4.1 further suggests that almost a third (30%) of blacks considered running water as the most important service in 1998. This figure declined marginally by 2% in 1999. The service priorities among coloureds tended to focus on affordable housing and health care (25% each) in 1998. Among blacks, housing had decreased from 20% to 18% as an important service between December 1998 and November 1999. A quarter of whites indicated running water (25%) followed by education (22%) and health care (21%) in November 1999. A large proportion of Indians indicated education (37%) as the most important service in their area.

4.4 Perceptions of trends in service delivery at local areas

Assessing the delivery of infrastructure services since the 1994 election, a significant proportion of South Africans gave unambiguously positive assessments on the provision of both electricity and running water. For example, perceptions of improvement in the provision of electricity increased from 41% in December 1998 to 46% in November 1999. The provision and delivery of most essential services appear to have improved over time, in most sectors in South Africa over the past five years. These services include running water, affordable housing, electricity and even local police services. There was a corresponding decline on the number of people who believe that essential services had declined between December 1998 and November 1999 (Table 4.2).

The increasing levels of rating on service delivery bode well for the second elected democratic government with its theme focusing on service delivery. Obviously, positive ratings do not blindly suggest support for all aspects of service delivery mechanisms, as these are often complex and dynamic. Establishing monitoring systems and accountability measures are some of the challenges, which often result in project longevity and at times closure of projects.

Perceptions on levels of service delivery increased between December 1998 and November 1999. For example, levels of improvement have been recorded in running water

from 35% to 39%; from 22% to 28% in affordable housing; from 21% to 24% in local police services; and from 33% to 39% in the delivery of public transport, between December 1998 and November 1999 (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: ‘Since the general elections of 1994, how would you say the delivery of the following services has changed in the area where you live, if at all?’

Service	Improved %		Stayed the same %		Worsened %		Uncertain/ Did not know %	
	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999
Running water	35	39	50	46	14	15	1	1
Affordable housing	22	28	38	37	35	31	6	4
Electricity	41	46	42	39	16	15	1	1
Health care	36	36	32	30	30	32	2	2
Local police services	21	24	44	44	33	29	2	3
Tarred roads and street drainage	25	29	38	37	35	32	1	2
Recreational facilities	17	20	44	40	29	29	10	12
Local public libraries	19	21	47	44	24	24	10	11
Water-borne sewerage	21	25	53	48	21	21	5	7
Public transport	33	39	36	32	24	25	7	5
Education*	*	33	*	33	*	28	*	5
Refuse removal	27	28	45	42	23	24	5	6

* Indicates first inclusion in November 1999.
Source: HSRC, 1998, 1999 public opinion surveys.

There are several reasons for these improvements. First, after the first years of policy formulation, several government departments started implementing pilot projects in housing, public works, community access roads, electricity projects and water-related projects, especially in rural areas. Although in most cases these projects were symbolic, some of them did benefit the poor, especially those in rural areas. Second, delivery mechanisms became more lubricated for effective delivery, starting around 1998 and in some cases increasing rapidly by the end of 1999. Third, the end of the first term of office of the first democratically elected government added impetus on the part of politicians and senior public servants to be seen to have fulfilled their mandate to deliver service. Improving perceptions of service delivery do not necessarily mean the actual delivery of better and durable services. However, monitoring public perceptions gives one a yardstick to measure progress and input of development projects.

Whereas there is considerable improvement on the perceptions of service delivery, there are also areas of concern when comparing the proportions of those indicating improvement and those who believe that the provision of services has deteriorated since 1994. For example, in November 1999 nearly a third (31%) of respondents believed that affordable housing provision had worsened compared to 28% who indicated improvement. Another second area of concern is the provision of local police services. Of the respondents, 29% believed that the situation worsened, whereas 24% believed that the situation improved. Yet another is the provision of recreational facilities with proportionally more people (29%) indicating worsening services provision than people indicating improvement (20%) (Table 4.2).

4.5 Service delivery by population group

The differences in the perceptions of service delivery by population group are not so much polarisation, as a reflection of the apartheid legacy. In the past poor quality services were provided to blacks, coloureds and Indians, while the bulk of good quality services were provided to whites. Both our December 1998 and November 1999 survey reveal interesting insights. First, the blacks indicated that the provision of running water stayed the same, electricity and health care deteriorated and affordable housing had improved. The coloureds perceived an improvement in all services. Among Indians the provision of water and tarred roads appear to have improved somewhat. Among white respondents, perceptions were generally less favourable, with for instance, 5% who thought that health care delivery had improved in 1999 and 12% who thought affordable housing had improved.

Table 4.3: Perceptions of service delivery improvement by population group

Service	Black %		White %		Coloured %		Indian %	
	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999
Running water	47	47	7	8	20	30	10	20
Affordable housing	26	30	9	12	21	34	9	13
Electricity	55	54	9	10	20	36	11	17
Health care	46	43	11	5	24	28	9	14
Local police services	27	28	8	7	16	24	3	11
Education*	*	42	*	6	*	19	*	6
Tarred roads	32	33	4	8	21	38	12	27

* Indicate first inclusion in November 1999.

* Not asked in 1998.

One of the most revealing findings was that proportionately more blacks indicated that the provision of education had improved (42%), compared to 18% who indicated deterioration. Among Indians (78%) and whites (66%), there were much higher proportions of respondents indicating deterioration. Again these findings suggest that the de-racialisation of education, and an attempt to provide services to those who were historically disenfranchised may be yielding some results. At the same time, some of those who were largely the beneficiaries of the previous political order felt that some of their privileges are being eroded. The more widespread perception of improvement in education among blacks is not an indication of satisfaction with matric results, but largely a rating of education in general. Indeed there are many aspects of the education system, which need to be revamped. However, the benefits may not necessarily be felt in the short term.

4.6 Perception of service delivery by province

Perceptions of service delivery also differ by province. A greater number of respondents in Northern Cape (51%), Free State (49%), Mpumalanga (50%) felt that there had been an improvement in the provision of running water (Table 4.4).

Housing improvement was noted in the Western Cape (from 22% in 1998 to 35% in 1999), Northern Cape (from 24% in 1998 to 52% in 1999), and Gauteng (from 19% in 1999 to 37% in 1999).

The Eastern Cape, Free State and Northern Province had proportionally larger numbers of people indicating improvement in the delivery of electricity than in other provinces. In terms of health care provision, the Eastern Cape (45%) ranked as the top beneficiary of improved services, followed by the Free State (42%) (Table 4.4).

In general provinces with relatively higher proportions of poverty and unemployment tended to indicate service delivery improvement. These findings suggest that provincial resource allocation may be appropriate. However, this does not necessarily suggest that there are proper targeting and monitoring systems.

Table 4.4: Comparing perceptions of service delivery improvement by province, November 1999

Province	Service delivery					
	Running water	Housing	Electricity	Health care	Public transport	Police services
Eastern Cape	38	23	22	45	36	23
Free State	49	36	23	42	51	40
Gauteng	47	37	14	37	41	29
KwaZulu-Natal	31	14	12	28	36	19
Mpumalanga	50	29	8	41	44	29
Northern Cape	51	52	4	33	28	28
Northern Province	29	17	27	38	44	18
North West	43	29	13	35	41	25
Western Cape	28	35	4	30	26	18

4.7 Conclusion

The importance of national representative surveys in providing a macro picture at a national level is clear. By using time series surveys, it is possible to trace emerging trends. This section has attempted to provide an assessment of perceptions of change in infrastructure service delivery since 1994.

Several observations can be made from the analysis of the two HSRC surveys. First, there has been some perceived improvement in the delivery of some services since 1994. Those services, which ranked high in terms of improvement, were running water, electricity, public transport and waste removal. Services, which at face value appear to have worsened are: affordable housing, local police services, tarred roads and recreational facilities. Although more people are dissatisfied than satisfied with the provision of affordable housing, local police services and tarred roads, the relative number of those satisfied increased between December 1998 and November 1999. These findings also warn against basing analysis on a once off snapshot survey at one point in time.

Second, in almost in all services, whites tended to perceive worsening of the delivery of services. On the other hand, blacks tended to note improvement in the delivery of services. In relation to almost all the services, whites were more likely than blacks to indicate some level of deterioration. One way to explain this is that in the past more resources were allocated to whites than to coloureds, Indians and blacks. Since 1994, the ANC-led government has tended to allocate increasing amounts of resources and capacity to address the legacy of apartheid. However the programme to reprioritise resource allocation has in some instances resulted in mixed results and differential impact.

Third, there was an uneven perception of infrastructure and service delivery improvement by province. Gauteng, Free State, Mpumalanga and North West appeared to score quite high on infrastructure and service delivery improvement in most services.

If the delivery of services is seen as a yardstick to measure levels of empowerment, there has been a certain degree of black female and rural empowerment since 1994. However, this does not necessarily mean that empowerment has been even.

Chapter 5

Perceptions about economic issues

Ian Hirschfeld

The November 1999 survey tested respondents' attitudes to their own as well as national economic circumstances at a time when respondents would have been encouraged by cuts in what were high real rates of interest.¹ However, the findings also suggest that the benefits of reduced interest rates had not yet been fully felt by respondents by the fourth quarter of 1999. A study by Przeworski et al. (1996:38)² concluded that economic factors are vital in sustaining democracies. Once a country has a democratic government, its level of economic development has a very strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive. Economically poor democracies are extremely fragile but democracies can survive if they generate economic growth. Przeworski et al. (1996:43) further noted that people expect a democracy to reduce income inequality, and that democracies were indeed more likely to survive when this occurred.

Although the South African economy is generally seen to have sound fundamentals with the high growth potential of an emerging market, longer-term employment trends remain a cause for concern. The number of employment opportunities created during each phase of economic recovery is not keeping pace with the growth of the country's economically active population. Already in 1997 around one in three (29%) of South Africa's economically active population were unemployed but actively seeking employment³ — a figure which is still quoted by economists today. This places South Africa broadly on a par with international unemployment rates: "According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) some 30% of the world's workforce is either unemployed or underemployed in industrial and developing countries taken together."⁴

5.1 Changes in personal economic situation

In light of these economic circumstances the attitudes of South Africans to changes in their economic situations over the past year were tested. While the largest percentage of respondents (53%) felt that their situations had worsened, 19% indicated that there had been an improvement and 23% felt that their situations had remained the same over the past year. Analysed by the statistically significant variable of population group it emerged that although the largest proportions of all population groups felt that their economic situations had worsened, Indian and white respondents were inclined to be more pessimistic than their black and coloured counterparts. Whereas 51% of black and 49% of coloured respondents indicated

¹ The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) reports that money market rates eased considerably in 1999. The SARB's repurchase rate, which is a signal to private banks declined from 19,32 % at the beginning of 1999 to 12,01% on 24 November 1999. *Quarterly Bulletin*, SARB, Dec. 1999.

² Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J.A. & Limongi, F. 1996. What makes democracies endure? *Journal of Democracy*, 7(1).

³ 1997 October Household Survey. SSA, Pretoria.

⁴ *Quarterly Economic Review*, March 1997:1

that their economic situations had worsened in the last year, the comparable figures for Indian and white respondents were 63% and 65% respectively. These figures not surprisingly reflect the effects of the generally difficult economic conditions that prevailed for most of the period under review.

Changes in individual economic circumstances were further explored through the question “How do you think the economic situations of people like you compare with what they were at the time of the April 1994 elections?” That around 39% of respondents saw an improvement in their economic situations and 35% a decline, while 20% thought things were about the same, is evidence of the impact of national economic programmes aimed at generating economic growth and development over the past five years.⁵

When disaggregated by population group and province a number of striking differences once more emerged. While 45% of black respondents perceived an improvement in their economic situations since April 1994, 41% of coloured and a majority of Indian and white respondents (respectively 55% and 65%) considered at their economic circumstances had worsened (Table 5.1). Viewed on a geographic basis it emerged that the highest levels of satisfaction with changes in their economic situations occurred among respondents in Mpumalanga (48%), the Northern Province (46%), KwaZulu-Natal (43%) and the North West (42%). The highest levels of dissatisfaction were recorded in the Western Cape (41%) and Eastern Cape (40%), while the province with the largest contribution to GDP (Gauteng) recorded a relatively high level of dissatisfaction at 37%.

Table 5.1: Change in economic situation since the April 1994 election (percentages)

Nature of change	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Got a lot better	10	4	6	10
Got a little better	35	14	25	20
Stayed about the same	21	15	23	12
Got a little worse	17	35	27	21
Got a lot worse	11	30	14	34
Do not know	6	2	5	3
Total	100	100	100	100

It is noteworthy that notwithstanding concern over their economic circumstances in the past year, slightly more South Africans are optimistic than pessimistic about their economic prospects over the next 12 months (respectively 35% versus 34% of respondents). A substantial proportion nonetheless expressed uncertainty about their economic situations over the next year (15%). Such uncertainty is likely to be influenced by ongoing concern about employment and employment creation as a leading anxiety among South Africans. (Chapter 3 reported that 41% of respondents in November 1999 identified job creation as the top national priority.)

The sentiments about changes in economic circumstances largely reflect the focus of national efforts to promote economic development and social upliftment. A comparable pattern emerged when analysing respondents’ attitudes to changes in the financial situations of their wider households.

⁵ In the HSRC’s December 1998 survey, comparative figures were: 42% improvement, 19% the same and 36% worse.

5.2 Household financial situation

A majority (53%) of respondents indicated that the financial situations of their households had worsened during the past 12 months. Approximately a fifth of respondents (respectively 22% and 21%) said that the financial situations of their households had either remained constant or improved. These figures represent a fundamentally similar situation to that measured a year earlier when the percentage of respondents who thought that their household situations had worsened, stayed the same or improved were respectively 58%, 21% and 20%. Variations between the population groups however are less marked than in the previous survey, with a decline in pessimism among coloured, Indian and white respondents most likely relating to the effects of the relaxation in interest rates and positive economic signals. The overall levels of optimism among black respondents have remained essentially unchanged following a difficult period for the economy (Table 5.2).

Table 5.2: Change in household financial situation in the past 12 months (percentages)

Nature of change	Black		White		Coloured		Indian	
	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999
Got worse	54	54	67	58	56	46	71	55
Stayed the same	20	20	21	26	31	29	21	20
Got better	25	22	11	16	11	24	7	24
Do not know	1	4	1	0	2	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

An age analysis of the findings further indicates that despite high levels of unemployment among the youth, respondents under 35 years remain somewhat more optimistic about changes in their household financial situation (25%) compared to those over 45 years old (19%).⁶ This difference is more sharply accentuated at the individual level where 39% of respondents under 35 years indicated a perceived improvement in their standard of living as compared to 27% among respondents 45 years and older. This serves as a positive signal for the process of economic development.

5.3 National economic situation and the effects of government policy

In attempting to gauge overall levels of economic optimism and pessimism, respondents were asked to indicate how they thought the general economic situation in the country had changed over the past 12 months. Responses were not dissimilar to those concerning individual and household economic circumstances. Fifty-four per cent of respondents thought the economic situation of the country had deteriorated over the past year, while 23% thought that national circumstances had improved and 17% that these had remained the same. Of particular relevance at this stage of the economic recovery in South Africa is the perceived efficacy of government economic policy in improving economic conditions. Respondents were asked six questions in order to determine the verdict of the electorate on the effects of the government's economic policies:


⁶ Respectively 42% and 28% of 20-29 and 30-39 year olds reported that they were employed but looking for work (1996 Census ten percent sample, SSA).

1. During the past 12 months, would you say that the government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much difference with regard to the financial situation of your household?
2. During the past 12 months, would you say that the government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much difference with regard to the general economic situation in the country?
3. During the past 12 months, would you say that the government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much difference with regard to the prices people like you have to pay for the things you buy?

While similar in many respects to the patterns of response to these questions in the December 1998 survey, a shift in sentiment is nonetheless noticeable. The perceived negative effects of government economic policy on household finances and the general economic situation have both declined by 18% while the negative effect of policy on prices was seen to have declined by 24% from 1998 to 1999. This finding was accompanied by modest improvements in optimism among respondents from all population groups for virtually all the policy aspects. It would appear that in an environment increasingly reflecting acknowledged sound economic fundamentals, respondent orientation to government policy is showing signs of positive change. However, it remains a concern that the largest proportion of respondents asked about the influence of policy on their household (42%) and the national economy (37%) felt that economic policy "did not make much difference", while 41% felt that policy in fact had a bad effect on prices in 1999. These views reveal a lack of understanding of the role and influence of government policy on economic conditions.

Table 5.3: Perceived effect of government economic policies over the last 12 months

Aspect	Effect	Black		White		Coloured		Indian		Total	
		1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999
On the financial situation of my household	Good	22	23	1	6	4	9	5	8	15	19
	Bad	36	22	70	48	46	28	67	46	44	26
On the general economic situation in the country	Good	22	24	3	8	6	9	4	5	16	20
	Bad	37	22	83	60	53	35	68	59	48	30
On prices people like you pay for the things you buy.	Good	13	21	1	3	2	6	5	2	9	16
	Bad	56	32	89	77	76	52	78	75	65	41



The decline in the proportion of respondents who were pessimistic about their household financial situations based on a one year comparison, when read together with positive changes in sentiment about the national economy and economic policy over the past year may indicate a basis for emerging economic optimism among a cross-section of the South African population. This is a development that will continue to be closely monitored in future surveys.

Chapter 6

Economic policies

Stephen Rule

This chapter focuses on the extent to which public sentiment favours state intervention in the economy, the imposition of higher taxes, and the role of the labour movement, preferential labour recruitment and external trade. Respondents were asked to respond to five statements relating to these issues. The tables relate to the Nov. 1999 survey only, but for comparative purposes reference is made to the Dec. 1998 figures.

6.1 Government role in the economy

Respondents were asked to indicate which of the following two statements “comes closest to your opinion, even if you do not agree with either statement entirely”.

(A) THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE ECONOMY, BECAUSE THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND MARKET FORCES ARE UNLIKELY TO SOLVE THE COMPLEX ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY.

(B) THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ALLOW THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND MARKET FORCES TO OPERATE MORE FREELY, BECAUSE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS ONLY MAKE THE COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WORSE.

More people favoured an active role for the government in the economy (49%) (50% in 1998) than allowing market forces to operate more freely (37%) (44% in 1998), but one in seven (14%) (7% in 1998) were not able to express a preference. There were marked geographical differences in opinion on this matter. Respondents in two of the poorer provinces, namely the Eastern Cape (57%) and KwaZulu-Natal (55%) were more in favour of state intervention in the economy. In contrast, the wealthier Gauteng (46%) and Western Cape (40%) provinces were less in favour of state intervention and more amenable to permitting the free reign of market forces. Respondents in one of the other poor provinces, Northern Province, favoured intervention over the free market, but more than a quarter (26%) did not have an opinion on the matter.

Table 6.1: Preference for active government role in economy or free market operation, by province (percentages)

Preference	Provinces									Total
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
Active	57	52	46	55	54	45	44	43	40	49
Free market	32	31	44	30	34	42	30	43	45	37
Don't know	11	17	10	15	12	13	26	14	15	14

Disaggregated by the country's different groupings, it emerged that a much larger proportion of the black population was in favour of an active role for the government in the economy than was the case amongst the other groups. There were, however, noticeable differences amongst the different black groupings, with 61% of isiXhosa-speaking respondents favouring a prominent role for the state as opposed to only 49% of the "other" black group (those speaking the Xitsonga, Tshivenda, isiNdebele, siSwati or English). More Indians and especially whites expressed a preference for market forces than for government intervention. Amongst the coloured population, there was an almost even split between those in favour of each of the two options.

Table 6.2: Preference for active government role in economy or free market operation, by ethno-linguistic group (percentages)

Preference	Ethno-linguistic group								Total
	Black Zulu	Black Sotho group	Black Xhosa	Black other	Coloured	White Afr.	White other	Indian	
Active	59	56	61	49	44	11	16	37	49
Free market	27	29	27	32	40	78	79	57	37
Don't know	14	15	12	19	16	11	5	6	14

Looked at from an age group perspective, people over 50 years were least in favour (43%) of an active role in the economy for the government, but also the least informed, with one in five (22%) saying that they did not know. In contrast, almost or just more than half of the population in the three categories aged 50 years or less were in favour of state intervention.

Table 6.3: Preference for active government role in economy or free market operation, by age group (percentages)

Preference	Age group				Total
	<26 years	26-35 yrs	36-50 yrs	>50 yrs	
Active	55	49	50	43	49
Free market	36	40	36	35	37
Don't know	9	11	14	22	14

In relation to living standard measures (LSMs), there was an inverse relationship between LSM and attitude towards the role of the government. People in the top two LSM categories were far more in favour of allowing the freer operation of market forces than were those in any of the other categories. The lowest LSM category was most in favour (62%) of an active role for the government. Additionally, the proportions who were not able to express an opinion on this issue decreased from about one in four amongst the two lowest LSM groups to only one in 16 of the top LSM group.

Table 6.4: Preference for active government role in economy or free market operation, by living standard measure (percentages)

Preference	Living standard measure								Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Active	62	47	55	59	55	56	37	19	49
Free market	17	26	24	29	32	31	52	75	37
Don't know	21	27	21	12	13	13	11	6	14

6.2 Views about taxation policy

(A)	I WOULD BE WILLING TO PAY MORE IN TAXES, IF THIS WOULD ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE THE SERVICES THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO ME.
(B)	I WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO PAY MORE IN TAXES, EVEN IF THIS MEANT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO IMPROVE THE SERVICES THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO ME.

Faced with the choice of paying additional taxes, provided that they were used to improve services that were specifically of importance to the respondent, almost half (49%) replied in the affirmative. Two in five (40%) were not prepared to pay more taxes even if services that were important to them were to improve. The remaining 11% could not give a decisive answer. These figures mirrored the findings of the 1998 survey, when 48% favoured additional designated taxation, 45% opposed it and 7% did not know. The openness to more taxes was significantly more prevalent in the Eastern Cape (66%) than in the provinces with the strongest economies, namely Gauteng (41%) and the Western Cape (39%) (Table 6.5).

Table 6.5: Willingness to pay more taxes for better services, by province (percentages)

Willingness	Province									Total
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
More taxes	66	57	41	42	55	36	60	46	39	49
No more taxes	28	23	49	46	35	48	31	40	49	40
Don't know	6	20	10	12	10	16	9	14	11	11

The pattern recurs when disaggregated by ethno-linguistic group, with a larger proportion of the black population (55%) being prepared to pay more taxes than was the case amongst the other groups. Almost two-thirds (65%) of isiXhosa speakers, most of whom live in the Eastern Cape¹ were willing to pay more taxes. In contrast, just one-third (37%) of coloured people and one-quarter (25%) of Indians and whites were in the same category.

Table 6.6: Willingness to pay more taxes for better services, by ethno-linguistic group (percentages)

Willingness	Ethno-linguistic group								Total
	Black Zulu	Black Sotho Group	Black Xhosa	Black other	Coloured	White Afrik.	White other	Indian	
More taxes	50	49	65	59	37	20	34	25	49
No more taxes	38	35	28	31	49	69	60	70	40
Don't know	12	16	7	10	14	11	6	5	11

There was a clearly inverse relationship between age group and willingness to pay more taxes - almost three in five (59%) members of the youngest component of the adult population (aged less than 26 years) approved of extra taxes. The oldest component (over 50s) were less willing, with only 40% stating that they would be prepared to pay more taxes if this would allow the government to improve services that were important to them (Table 6.7)

¹ Almost three-quarters of the Country's 7.2 million isiXhosa speakers live in the Eastern Cape (Statistics South Africa, The People of South Africa Population Census, 1996, Report 03-01-11).


Table 6.7: Willingness to pay more taxes for better services, by age group (percentages)

Willingness	Age group				Total
	<26 years	26-35 years	36-50 years	>50 years	
More taxes	59	51	47	40	49
No more taxes	34	40	44	42	40
Don't know	7	9	9	18	11

When investigating issues related to tax, it is clearly important to differentiate between willingness and ability to boost the resources of the Receiver of Revenue. Not surprisingly, the proportions of the population in the lowest LSM categories who were willing to pay additional taxes were much higher than those of the top two LSM categories.

Table 6.4: Willingness to pay more taxes for better services, by standard measure (percentages)

Willingness	Living standard measure								Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
More taxes	60	50	50	57	54	55	35	29	49
No more taxes	31	29	36	33	36	33	56	66	40
Don't know	9	21	14	10	10	12	9	5	11



Examined more specifically from an income perspective, more than half (55%) of those with a zero level gross personal monthly income were prepared to pay additional taxes. As this group constitutes more than two-fifths (42%) of the adult population of potential taxpayers, it means that the Receiver should not get excited. The proportions prepared to pay more taxes declined to 49% for the R1 to R579 per month group and to as low as 30% for the R5830 to R12499 group (Table 6.9). Interestingly, however, more than one out of three of those earning a gross monthly personal income in excess of R2500, were willing to pay more taxes if it would allow the government to improve the services that are important to them. A case for designated tax revenue could be made here, albeit from a very small segment of the adult population (3,4%).

Table 6.9: Willingness to pay more taxes for better services, by monthly gross personal income (percentages)

Willingness	Personal income							Total
	None	R1- R579	R580- R2499	R2500- R5829	R5830- R12499	R12500+	Refuse/ don't know	
More taxes	55	49	47	35	30	38	34	49
No more taxes	35	36	44	60	63	57	58	40
Don't know	10	15	9	5	7	5	8	11

6.3 Views about the need for a strong and active labour movement

(A) A STRONG AND ACTIVE LABOUR MOVEMENT IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICANS.
(B) THE ACTIVITIES OF LABOUR UNIONS ARE AN OBSTACLE TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC WELLBEING OF MOST SOUTH AFRICANS.

The attitudes that respondents had towards labour unions were gauged by the next question. Almost half (49%) of the population thought that there should be a strong and active labour movement in the country, to protect the economic interests of the majority. This represented a slight decline since the December 1998 survey, when 57% held this view. One-third (33%) felt that unions obstructed economic wellbeing for most South Africans (same as 1998) and one in five (18%) did not know which option was best (10% in 1998). People in the Eastern Cape were significantly more (67%) well disposed towards unions than those in the other provinces. This correlates with the high levels of poverty and unemployment that exist in the Eastern Cape. Clearly unions were widely viewed there as suitable organisations to defend their economic interests. Not unexpectedly, much lower proportions of the populations of the wealthier provinces saw the need for an active labour movement. Relatively high levels of uncertainty about this issue existed in the Northern Province (28%), Free State (28%) and Northern Cape (25%), where a quarter or more did not know what they felt about unions (Table 6.10).

Table 6.10: Attitude towards labour unions, by province (percentages)

Attitude	Province									Total
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
Active unions needed	67	50	42	51	47	44	48	41	46	49
Unions obstruct well being	21	22	45	32	32	31	24	36	36	33
Don't know	12	28	13	17	21	25	28	23	18	18

Almost two-thirds (64%) of speakers of isiXhosa indicated that they favoured a strong and active labour movement, corresponding with the high approval level in the Eastern Cape, where most of the population belongs to this group. The other black, coloured and Indian groups were slightly less positively orientated towards unions with about one in two seeing the need for them. In contrast, only one in five whites agreed with unions and two-thirds thought that unions constituted an obstacle to the economic wellbeing of most South Africans (Table 6.11).

Table 6.11: Attitude towards labour unions, by Ethno-linguistic group (percentages)

Attitude	Ethno-linguistic group								Total
	Black Zulu	Black Sotho group	Black Xhosa	Black other	Coloured	White Afrik.	White other	Indian	
Active unions needed	51	53	64	47	53	19	22	49	49
Unions obstruct well being	31	26	23	29	27	65	67	43	33
Don't know	18	21	13	24	20	16	11	8	18

Younger members of the population were more inclined to feel the need for a strong labour movement than their older counterparts. Whereas more than half of those aged 35 years or less were in favour of unions, this was the case with just less than half (49%) in the 36 to 50 year-old age group and only 40% of those older than 50 years. About one-third of all age groups thought that unions obstructed economic well being in the country. Nearly one-fifth (17%) of those between 36-50 years did not know how they felt about this issue, as opposed to more than a quarter (27%) of the over 50 years age category (Table 6.12).

Table 6.12: Attitude towards labour unions, by age group (percentages)

Attitude	Age group				Total
	<26 years	26-35 yrs	36-50 yrs	>50 yrs	
Active unions needed	55	53	49	40	49
Unions obstruct well being	33	29	34	33	33
Don't know	12	18	17	27	18

Whereas just below half (49%) of all the LSM categories felt that there should be a strong labour movement to protect the economic interests of the majority, this was the case with only 42% of the second highest LSM category and only three out of ten (31%) of the top LSM category. Clearly a higher standard of living correlated with a lower sense of need for labour union representation (Table 6.13).

Table 6.13: Attitude towards labour unions, by living standard measure (LSM) (percentages)

Attitude	Living standard measure								Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Active unions needed	52	52	48	54	54	54	42	31	49
Unions obstruct well being	36	19	24	28	27	33	42	60	33
Don't know	12	29	28	18	19	12	16	9	18

6.4 Views about the preferential employment of previously disadvantaged groups

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they felt that people from “previously disadvantaged groups” (PDGs) should be given preference when it came to the allocation of jobs or promotions. These groups would constitute black people, women and disabled people. More than half of the populations (55%) were in favour of such a system and just more than a quarter (28%) opposed it. About one in six (17%) had no opinion on the topic (Table 6.14). Their figures were indicative of a slight shift in public opinion since 1998. At that stage 62% had supported affirmative action in the workplace, 31% had opposed it and 7% had not known.

PEOPLE FROM PREVIOUSLY DISADVANTAGED GROUPS SHOULD BE GIVEN PREFERENCE BY EMPLOYERS WHEN THEY HIRE AND PROMOTE WORKERS.

Not surprisingly, the provinces with the highest proportions of the population who fitted into these categories were most in favour of this form of affirmative action. These provinces also constitute the poorest in the country, namely the Eastern Cape, Northern Province and KwaZulu-Natal. Almost three-fifths (55%) of the population were in favour of preference for PDGs. In contrast, the proportions of the population that opposed job preference for PDGs were highest in Gauteng and the Western Cape (both 42%), the provinces with the strongest economies in the country. The highest levels of uncertainty about this issue were in the Free State, where almost one-third (32%) had no opinion (Table 6.14).

Table 6.14: Job reference for previously disadvantaged groups, by province (percentages)

Attitude	Province									Total
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
Yes	76	42	42	61	56	42	68	47	44	55
No	17	26	42	21	33	32	18	25	42	28
No opinion	7	32	16	18	11	26	14	28	14	17

A system of job and promotion preference for PDGs was unsurprisingly much more positively viewed by black South Africans than by the other groups. This was especially the case amongst isiXhosa speakers, four out of five (79%) of whom held this view. Amongst

isiZulu speakers there was less unanimity on the topic, but nevertheless almost two-thirds (63%) favoured such a system. Smaller proportions of the coloureds (43%) and Indians (47%) were in favour of job preference, reflective of their arguably less disadvantaged status under the previous government. At the other extreme, more than three-quarters (77%) of Afrikaners were of the view that preference should not be given to PDGs in the hiring or promotion of workers. The latter group obviously would have the least to gain materially from such a system (Table 6.15). In terms of gender, males were more in favour (58%) of affirmative action than women (53%). Black men (70%) were markedly more in favour than black women (60%), the latter also being more inclined than men to be neutral (22%) on the issue.

Table 6.15: Job preference for previously disadvantaged groups (PDGs), by ethno-linguistic group (percentages)

Job preference	Ethno-linguistic group								Total
	Black Zulu	Black Sotho group	Black Xhosa	Black other	Coloured	White Afrik.	White other	Indian	
Yes	63	52	79	61	43	14	13	47	55
No	17	18	12	24	40	78	77	48	28
No opinion	20	30	9	15	17	8	10	5	17

Higher proportions of younger than older people in South Africa favoured job preference for PDGs. Whereas almost two-thirds (62%) of those aged 25 years or younger thought that preference should be given to PDGs, this was the case with less than half (49%) of the people aged more than 50 years. The age group with the highest proportion of people who did not offer an opinion on the issue was also the oldest group, namely the over 50s (Table 6.16).

Table 6.16: Job preference for previously disadvantaged groups (PDGs), by age group (percentages)

Job preference	Age group				Total
	<26 years	26-35 years	36-50 years	>50 years	
Yes	62	54	53	49	55
No	24	30	32	28	28
No opinion	14	15	15	23	17

People with the highest standard of living were least in favour of preferential employment and promotion for PDGs. This merely reflects the reality that most people in the top two LSM categories were not previously disadvantaged under the apartheid government (Table 6.17).

Table 6.17: Job preference for previously disadvantaged groups (PDGs), by living standard measure (LSM) (percentages)

Job preference	Living standard measure								Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Yes	75	63	63	66	59	61	33	22	55
No	18	13	15	16	22	23	56	69	28
No opinion	7	24	22	18	19	16	11	9	17

6.5 Views about state restrictions on South Africans' foreign business dealings

WORLD MARKETS ARE REDICTABLE AND DANGEROUS, AND THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD THEREFORE RESTRICT BUSINESS DEALINGS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICANS AND PEOPLE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.

Confronted with the contention that world markets are “unpredictable and dangerous”, the population was divided between those who felt that the government should restrict business dealings (39%), those who felt that it should not (31%) and those who could not give an opinion on the matter (30%). In December 1998 the figures had been 39:44:17 indicative of a drop in support for allowing the free market to operate unbridled. Just less than half or in one case more than half of the population in four of the country's poorest provinces were of the view that the government should restrict such business dealings. These were in the Northern Province (53%), Mpumalanga (48%), KwaZulu-Natal (45%) and the Eastern Cape (43%). High levels of uncertainty on this issue emerged in the Northern Cape (52%) and Free State (46%) (Table 6.18).

Table 6.18: Government should restrict business dealings with foreign markets, by province (percentages)

Restrict business dealings	Province									Total
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
Yes	43	20	36	45	48	28	53	31	28	39
No	32	34	34	30	28	20	20	31	41	31
No opinion	25	46	29	25	24	52	27	38	31	30

The white population was least in favour of government restrictions on foreign business dealings, with only one in seven (13%) subscribing to this view. One-quarter (25%) of coloureds and one-third of both Indians (33%) and members of the Sotho group (speakers of Sesotho, Sepedi or Setswana) (33%) felt that the government should restrict foreign business dealings as did about half of the other black groupings. A lack of information about or exposure to foreign markets and a fear of the effects of globalisation could be attributable for these widely held negative attitudes (Table 6.19).

Table 6.19: Government should restrict business dealings with foreign markets, by ethno-linguistic group (percentages)

Restrict business dealings	Ethno-linguistic group								Total
	Black Zulu	Black Sotho group	Black Xhosa	Black other	Coloured	White Afrik.	White other	Indian	
Yes	47	33	49	51	25	13	13	33	39
No	26	24	23	23	37	59	72	56	31
No opinion	27	43	28	26	38	28	15	11	30

Younger people, arguably with less experience of world markets, were more in favour of government restrictions on foreign business dealings than were older people. Whereas almost half (46%) of those aged 25 years or less were in favour of restrictions, only one in three (31%) of the over 50s held the same view (Table 6.20).

Table 6.20 Government should restrict business dealings with foreign markets, by age group (percentages)

Restrict business dealings	Age group				Total
	<26 years	26-35 years	36-50 years	>50 years	
Yes	46	41	37	31	39
No	30	35	35	27	31
No opinion	23	24	28	42	30

The wealthiest segments of the population were least in favour of government restrictions on foreign business dealings. Larger proportions of people in LSM categories 7 and 8 were opposed to restrictions than were in favour of them. In particular, more than two-thirds (69%) of people in the highest LSM category felt that the government should not restrict foreign business dealings. It is likely that the majority of South Africans who conduct such dealings would fall into the top LSM category (Table 6.21).

Table 6.21: Government should restrict business dealings with foreign markets, by living standard measure (percentages)

Restrict business dealings	Living standard measure								Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Yes	47	47	46	43	40	44	30	17	39
No	25	18	19	26	27	26	41	69	31
No opinion	28	35	35	31	33	30	29	14	30

Chapter 7

Community participation

Johan Olivier

7.1 Support for public service wage strikes

In order to determine the extent to which public opinion is in favour of wage strikes by public servants, respondents were requested to 'Indicate how strongly you support or oppose the public service wage strike action during August this year'.


There appears to be marginal support for the wage strikes. Whereas about 35% of the respondents indicated that they supported or strongly supported the strike action, about 32% were opposed to it. One in five (20%) of the respondents were neutral and an additional 13% were undecided.

The results reported in Table 7.1 show that support for the strike action was strongest among coloured (43%) and Indian (39%) respondents. Marginally more (39%) of the Indian respondents supported the action than those who opposed (37%) it. The strongest opposition came from white respondents of whom more than half (52%) indicated that they opposed such action by public servants. It is important to note that black and Indian respondents were less likely to express an opinion than were coloured and white respondents.

Table 7.1: Support for public service strikes, by population group

Population group	Support %	Neutral %	Oppose %	Don't know %	Total
Black	36	19	29	16	100
White	19	23	52	6	100
Coloured	43	28	22	7	100
Indian	39	11	37	13	100
Total population	35	20	32	13	100

The results of further analyses (not shown here) suggest that male respondents were somewhat more likely to support (39%) the strike action than were females (32%). Also, on the whole respondents in the income brackets of R580 per month or more were more likely to support the strike action by civil servants than those individuals who earn less than R580 per month. Respondents living in the Free State showed the least (19%) support for the strikes while the strongest support came from respondents living in the Eastern Cape (42%) followed by the Western Cape (40%), Northern Province (38%) and KwaZulu-Natal (37%).



7.2 Attendance of religious meetings/services

In order to measure the level of religious commitment among South Africans, respondents were requested to indicate 'How often do you usually attend a religious meeting or service?'

The vast majority of South Africans appear to be religious devotees. The results show that three out of every four (76%) South Africans attend religious services once a month or more regularly. In fact, close to a half (47%) of South Africans attend religious services once per week or more than once per week. Close to one in five (18%) of the respondents indicated that they attend such services 2-3 times a month. Slightly more than one in ten (14%) of the respondents indicated that they never attend religious gatherings (Table 7.2).

The results reported in Table 7.2 show that about half of the members of all four population groups attend religious gatherings once or more per week. The highest percentages of persons who never attend religious gatherings were recorded in the case of black (16%) and Indian (13%) respondents.

Table 7.2: Frequency of attending religious services

Population group	Once or more per week %	2-3 times a month %	Once a month %	1-4 times per year %	Never %	Total %
Black	46	17	12	9	16	100
White	48	21	10	14	7	100
Coloured	49	20	12	16	3	100
Indian	53	9	9	16	13	100
Total	47	18	11	10	14	100

When analysed by age group the results suggest that there are marginal differences in the extent to which members of various age cohorts attend religious gatherings. The results do however suggest that members of the younger age cohorts are more likely not to attend religious gatherings. Close to one in five (18%) of the respondents in the 18-24 year age group indicated that they never attend religious gatherings. The corresponding results for persons in the 35-44 and 55 years and older cohorts were respectively 13% and 11%.

Table 7.3: Frequency of attending religious services, by gender

Gender	Once or more per week %	2-3 times a month %	Once a month %	1-4 times per year %	Never %	Total %
Males	36	15	12	14	23	100
Females	53	20	11	8	8	100

Significant differences are evident when the results are analysed by gender (see Table 7.3). Women are more likely than men to attend religious gatherings regularly. In fact, about one-quarter (23%) of male respondents indicated that they never attend religious gatherings as opposed to about 8% of female respondents.

7.3 Membership of selected civil society organisations

Civil society organisations represent an important ingredient of a stable democracy. Especially since civil society organisations not only provide an important link between citizens and the state, but also in that they ensure accountability on the part of the state.

The election to power of South Africa’s first democratic government in 1994 had significant implications for not only state-civil society relations, but also for civil society itself. The general expectation was that civil society would enter a period of demobilisation after the 1994 election.

What changes did in fact take place in levels of involvement in civil society organisations since 1994? Did levels of involvement drop as expected? In order to trace trends in organisational involvement, the HSRC has been tracking involvement in civil society organisations in its annual surveys since March 1994.

Membership in a range of organisations that include political parties, civics, unions, women’s organisations and anti-crime groups, were investigated. The results are reported in Table 7.4. The percentages indicate the levels of active membership and/or the holding of office in these organisations. A number of trends are evident.

Membership in political parties decreased significantly since 1994. About one in five of the respondents were active members of a political party shortly before the founding election of 1994. This decreased overall to less than one in ten in November 1999. The high level of political engagement in the run-up to the 1994 election explains much of this. Active membership of political parties was highest among black respondents (24%) followed by whites (17%). Amongst coloureds and Indians, levels were about 5% each.

Table 7.4: Organisational involvement, 1994-1999 (percentages)

Organisation	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Political party	21	13	9	15	10	9
Trade Union	8	6	5	7	8	7
Women's organisation	*	7	6	8	11	7
Youth organisation	10	9	7	9	10	7
Civic organisation	7	4	3	5	7	5
Anti-crime organisation	*	*	*	*	8	5

* Not measured.

The downward trend clearly suggests that South Africans are in the process of disengaging from active politics. This was evident among white South Africans where active membership decreased from 17% in 1994 to 9% in 1999. Active membership among black respondents decreased even more markedly from its high of 24% in 1994 to 10% in 1999. It is quite possible that the high level of involvement in 1994 was 'unnatural' and the country is beginning to approach 'normal' levels of active political engagement.

Active membership in most of the other types of organisations remained fairly stable from the first measurement in 1994 to the most recent measurement in 1999, with some variation in between. These results clearly suggest that there has not been a trend towards demobilisation in South African civil society since 1994. Membership in those organisations most active during the struggle for democracy, i.e. unions and civics, remained fairly constant between 1994 and 1999.

Chapter 8

Perceptions about democracy

Ian Liebenberg

8.1 Preferences with regard to political system

South Africa's democracy was born in 1994. It is therefore essential that the government and its institutions be informed of the views and needs of the citizenry. National surveys are a means to reveal these needs and views. This section presents a discussion of responses to a set of statements on democracy as a system of government that was included in the HSRC public opinion survey of November 1999. The respondents were requested to indicate to which of the following statements they agree most strongly:


- Democracy is always preferable to any other system of government;
- In some cases an authoritarian government or a dictatorship is preferable to democracy;
- For people like me it does not matter whether there is a democracy or not;
- Uncertain/Do not know.

The national average for responses in favour of a democracy was (72%). Provinces that registered an above-average score for preferring democracy to other systems of government were Mpumalanga (91%), the Eastern Cape (80%), the Free State (77%) and the Western Cape (75%). Provinces that registered a below-average score were Gauteng (71%), KwaZulu Natal (67%), North West (66%) and the Northern Cape (64%).

The greatest agreement with an authoritarian government was registered in North West (12%), the national average being a low (7%). The Western Cape and the Northern Cape registered the lowest agreement with an authoritarian system (respectively 3% and 4%). For the "Uncertain/Do not know" category the national average was 14%, but the figures for the Northern Province (20%) and KwaZulu-Natal (17%) were higher. The lowest "Uncertain/Do not know" score was registered in Mpumalanga (3%).

Given South Africa's history of racial oppression, the different population groups may differ greatly in respect of their views on democracy vis-à-vis other systems of government and in respect of their interest in the issue. The responses to the set of statements cited above revealed that 72% of blacks, 75% of coloureds and 74% of whites preferred democracy. Indians registered a somewhat lower figure (64%). Whites had the lowest preference for an authoritarian system (3%), followed by coloureds (5%). Blacks and Indians registered a slightly higher preference (7% and 10% respectively).

Figure 7: Preferences for democracy - national



When comparing South Africa with other “new” democracies, the preference figure for democracy in South Africa (72%) is similar to that in Spain (70%), higher than that in Chile (52%) and lower than that in Argentina (77%) and Greece (87%).¹

8.2 Views on liberal democracy

There are many forms of democracy, such as *representative democracy*, *popular or direct democracy*, *participatory democracy*, *social democracy*, *democratic socialism* and *liberal democracy*.² This section deals with the opinions of South Africans with regard to *liberal democracy* as gleaned from the HSRC survey of November 1999. The primary focus is on national and regional (provincial) data.³


In order to investigate public opinion on the role of government and acceptable limits to state intervention, respondents were requested to indicate whether they strongly agree, agree, hold no opinion, strongly disagree, disagree or do not know how to respond in respect of six statements. Their responses are discussed per statement below:

¹ Linz, J.J. & Stepan, A: 1996. Toward consolidated democracies. *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2).

² See Dahl R. 1970. *After the Revolution? Authority in a good society*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Dahl, R. 1989. *Democracy and its critics*. Nev. Haven: Yale University Press; and Held, D. 1987. *Models of democracy Oxford: Polity Press*. For South African contextualisations, see Kotze, H.J. & Van Wyk, J.J. 1986. *Politieke konsepte*. Kaapstad: Perskor-Uitgewery, p. 30; Slabbert, F. 1992. *The quest for democracy: South Africa in transition*. London: Penguin Books, pp. 1-10; Bredenkamp, F. (red.) 1991. *Staatkundige en politieke begrippe*. Pretoria: RGN, pp. 6ff, 29ff.

³ Population group or gender breakdowns of the data do not feature in the analysis of views on liberal democracy. This *modus operandi* is the result of earlier studies on political participation that illustrated that regional differences are more prevalent than population group or gender differences. See for example Roefs, M. & Liebenberg, I. 1999. Notes on public participation in South Africa HSRC Website: hsrc.ac.za/delivered/mrjcr115.html.

Figure 8: Freedom of speech



- *The government should have the authority to prevent citizens from expressing opinions that are negative and unpopular.* (Freedom of speech)

This statement was aimed at exploring public views on government curtailment of freedom of speech. Levels of disagreement differed clearly from one province to another. In the Western Cape, 63% of the respondents disagreed with the statement whereas 24% agreed with it. (Only 9% of the Western Cape respondents “strongly agreed” in contrast to 30% that “strongly agreed” in a province such as the Eastern Cape, for example.) The Northern Cape registered the highest score (22%) for “Don’t know” with regard to this statement.⁴ Respondents in the Eastern Cape (an ANC stronghold) registered 59% agreement and 32% disagreement with the statement. Other provinces that registered a higher than 50% agreement were KwaZulu-Natal (55%) (adjacent to the Eastern Cape) and North West (52%). The Northern Province scored the highest in the “Strongly agree” and “Agree” categories combined (63%).⁵

- *Citizens should have the right to form or join organisations freely, such as political parties, business associations, trade unions and other interest groups.* (Freedom of association)

This statement relates to freedom of association and elicited strong agreement in all the provinces. The Eastern Cape registered 90% agreement and the Western Cape 86%, followed

⁴ The “Don’t know” category in respect of the statement dealing with freedom of speech has long-term political implications. The high “Don’t know” percentage for the Northern Cape, for instance, provides leeway to politicians favouring authoritarian approaches to convince the “Don’t know” citizenry into support for an authoritarian system. On the other hand, it allows space for anti-authoritarians to convince the same group of the advantages of a democratic system.

⁵ Although it is not the intention to entertain a debate on repressive inclinations, high scores for this statement may indicate lack of political tolerance.

by Mpumalanga with 82%, Gauteng with 76% and the Northern Province with 75%. Somewhat lower were KwaZulu-Natal, the Northern Cape and the Free State, with figures declining from 72% to 65%. The national average for agreement on this statement was 82%. The lower than average figure for Gauteng (76%) is interesting. As the economic hub of South Africa its economic advantage could have been expected to translate into more agreement with freedom of association. Less than 10% of respondents in each province and in some cases as low as 4% disagreed with the statement.

- *The government should be allowed to ignore the constitution if a majority of citizens clearly support their action.*

Linked to government's public commitment to the constitution and the association between constitutionality and democracy, the responses to this statement are of great importance. The statement elicited more "No opinion" and "Don't know" responses than "Strongly agree" and "Agree" responses. Disagreement (inclusive of "Strongly disagree" and "Disagree") per province was as follows: Gauteng (43%), Western Cape (41%), Northern Cape (37%), Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga (35% each), Northern Province (34%), Free State and North West (31% each), and KwaZulu-Natal (24%). Agreement with government disregard for the constitution if the majority of citizens support such disregard (with agreement implying the priority of majority opinion over constitutionality) was the highest in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape (49% each) and the Northern Province (41%). However, they all scored below 50%. The rather high percentages in the "Don't know" and "No opinion" categories in the Northern Cape (35%) and the Free State (34%) are disconcerting because they point to potential space for political manipulation of the citizenry by non-democratic power holders.

- *Elected officials should bear ultimate responsibility for government decisions. (Accountability)*

This statement dealt with government accountability. The combined "Strongly agree" and "Agree" responses to this statement were as follows: Eastern Cape (82%), Western Cape (69%), Mpumalanga (68%), Free State (67%), Northern Province (63%), Gauteng (62%), KwaZulu-Natal (58%), Northern Cape (57%) and North West (51%). Disagreement with the statement was low throughout, with the Eastern Cape and the Free State registering the lowest figure (5% each). North West had the highest disagreement score (19%).

- *There should be at least two well-established parties for voters to choose from in elections. (Multi-partyism)*

This statement relates to multi-partyism or free political competition. The responses were well clustered around "Strongly agree" and "Agree" in all the provinces. The Western Cape (70%) registered the highest agreement, closely followed by the Northern Cape (69%) and the Free State (66%). Other provinces above the 50% mark were the Eastern Cape and Gauteng. The remaining four provinces (which constituted half of the national sample) registered between 40% and 50% (43% in KwaZulu-Natal, a previous IFP-dominated constituency; 47% in Mpumalanga; and 49% in both North West and the Northern Province, the latter being an ANC stronghold since 1994). Somewhat disconcerting were the percentages of respondents who selected the "No opinion" and "Don't know" options, because they imply that nearly one-third of the respondents in these three provinces did not make up their mind about multi-partyism or did not understand the concept. Three provinces

are particularly noticeable in this regard: KwaZulu-Natal (33%), North West (30%) and the Northern Cape (25%).

- *The government should control the flow of information to the public about issues of major national importance. (Censorship)*

This statement, which points to a specific form of censorship,⁶ elicited “Strongly agree” and “Agree” responses from the majority of respondents. The national average for the combined agreement categories was 52% and for the combined disagreement categories 23%. The “No opinion” and “Don’t know” categories accounted for 25% of the respondents nationally. The provinces where respondents registered the highest agreement were the Northern Province (60%) and the Eastern Cape (59%) (both ANC strongholds) and North West (56%). The Western Cape (43%), previously an NNP stronghold, registered the strongest disagreement.

⁶ This statement dealt with “issues of major national importance” and not issues of morality, such as religion, hate speech and/or pornography. It thus points to the right of government to control the flow of information on “sensitive” national issues — usually seen as issues within the security realm.

Chapter 9

Politics and voting

Stephen Rule

9.1 Party identification

As in previous surveys, respondents were questioned about their party political loyalties. Fieldworkers said to each respondent “I would like to ask how close or distant you feel towards various political parties and organisations. If you feel close to a party you would support it. If you feel distant you would oppose it.” The responses to this question are particularly interesting in the light of the shifts in political allegiance that occurred in the June 1999 election, five months before the survey was done. Table 9.1 lists the proportions of respondents who indicated closeness, neutrality, distance or uncertainty in respect of each of the 15 political parties.

Table 9.1: Feelings of closeness, neutrality or distance from each political party, November 1999 (percentages)

Political party	Very close	Close	Neutral	Distant	Very distant	Uncertain/ don't know
ACDP	0,8	3,9	10,4	12,6	46,2	26,0
ANC	46,4	18,7	7,9	5,5	16,0	5,5
AEB	0,2	0,6	5,8	12,3	52,4	28,7
Azapo	0,5	3,1	9,7	12,5	52,4	21,8
CP	0,1	1,7	6,7	14,5	54,5	22,3
DP	3,4	9,7	9,5	12,9	46,9	17,7
FA	0,3	1,1	6,0	13,6	53,1	25,9
FF	0,7	1,8	6,3	13,5	54,3	23,3
IFP	2,1	3,5	7,7	13,6	57,3	15,8
MF	0,3	0,9	5,1	11,4	55,8	26,4
NNP	2,5	7,9	9,3	13,9	51,3	15,2
PAC	0,9	5,9	10,8	13,2	51,6	17,8
SACP	1,7	4,9	8,2	12,6	50,4	22,1
UCDP	0,5	2,4	8,7	13,3	50,5	24,7
UDM	1,3	4,2	9,6	13,7	51,2	20,1

The feeling of closeness to a political party may not necessarily imply a deep existential commitment to the party. However, the distribution of respondents who said that they felt “very close” to each political party reflects the same broad pattern of support received by each party that contested the June 1999 election. Almost half (46%) indicated that they felt very close to the ANC. Much smaller proportions of respondents had this feeling about any of the other parties, even the main opposition parties, namely the DP (3%), IFP (2%) and NNP (3%). If those who felt “close” to each party are added to those who felt “very close”, the ANC comes out on top at 65%, followed by the DP (13%), NNP (10%) and IFP (6%). In comparison with the election results, it is apparent that feeling “very close” or “close” to the ANC translates more easily into voting for the ANC than is the case with opposition parties. Larger proportions of respondents indicated closeness to the DP and NNP

than the proportions that actually supported them in the election. In contrast, fewer respondents indicated closeness to the IFP than actually voted for them on 2 June 1999 (Table 9.1).

Of utility to analysts and political party organisers is to determine the demographic characteristics of political support bases.

Table 9.2: Feelings of closeness to each party by population group, November 1999

Political party	Very close or close				
	Blacks	Whites	Coloureds	Indians	Total
	Percentages				
ACDP	4	8	8	6	5
ANC	80	7	42	21	65
AEB	0	4	0	1	1
Azapo	5	0	1	0	4
CP	1	9	2	1	2
DP	4	54	22	35	13
FA	1	6	0	2	1
FF	1	16	1	0	3
IFP	6	7	1	2	6
MF	1	1	1	12	1
NNP	5	23	33	25	10
PAC	9	0	3	0	7
SACP	9	0	2	0	7
UCDP	2	4	5	1	3
UDM	5	8	7	2	6


9.2 Voting intention

When asked more directly, “which party would you support if an election were held tomorrow?”, 56% said that the ANC would get their vote. The DP and NNP followed with 6% and 4% respectively and the IFP with 3% (clearly an underestimate given its capture of 8% of votes in June 1999). The UDM would have received the vote of 2% and the ACDP of 1% of the voting population. The proportions that said they would not vote (6%) or that they did not know for which party they would vote (12%) was higher than those in the March 1999 survey. A similar proportion refused to divulge their intentions in both March and November 1999 (8%) (Table 9.3).

Table 9.3: Voting preferences for each party “if an election were held tomorrow”, 1996-1999

Party	Feb 96	Feb 97	Feb 98	Dec 98	Mar 99	Nov 99
ANC	55,3	52,8	44,5	48,8	56,2	56,1
DP	1,0	1,5	2,5	6,7	5,8	6,4
NNP	13,4	11,7	10,9	10,5	8,5	4,4
IFP	6,3	4,3	3,1	4,4	4,4	2,8
UDM	-	-	5,9	5,4	3,2	1,5
ACDP	0,4	0,4	1,1	1,1	1,1	1,2
FF	2,0	1,3	2,3	1,8	1,3	0,6
FA	-	-	-	0,4	0,4	0,3
PAC	0,8	1,8	2,1	1,1	0,9	0,2
CP	1,1	0,4	0,4	1,0	0,3	0,1
Azapo	0,2	0,4	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,1
SACP	0,1	0,6	0,6	0,0	0,0	0,0
Other	0,5	3,5	0,6	0,6	1,1	0,6
Would not vote	6,0*	10,2*	11,0*	10,8	3,6	5,8
Don't know	12,9	11,1	14,8	3,8	5,3	12,2
Refused				3,4	8,3	7,5

● “Would not vote” and “Refused” combined in these surveys.



In order to determine the likely result of an hypothetical election in November 1999 certain assumptions were made:

1. That those who said they would not vote, would not
2. That the feelings of closeness to any party that were expressed by those who were “uncertain” or who said that they “don’t know” or who refused to divulge their voting preference resulted in votes for those parties.
3. That IFP supporters had understated their preference. In surveys before the June election, the IFP vote was consistently understated owing to the reluctance of many of its supporters to express their voting intentions. For this reason, the IFP proportion in this calculation was adjusted upwards by the extent to which the HSRC’s March 1999 survey under-predicted the June 1999 election result.

The overall result of a hypothetical November 1999 election would not have differed significantly from that of the June election as is illustrated in Table 9.4. Interestingly, even though the CP did not participate in the 1999 election, a small proportion of the electorate nevertheless said that they would vote CP.

Table 9.4: Distribution of votes had an election been held in November 1999

Party	% of votes: committed + balance	Party	% of votes: committed + balance
ANC	56,3+10,0=66,3	FF	0,6+0,6=1,2
DP	6,4+3,2=9,6	UCDP	0,3+0,6=0,9
IFP	(2,9+1,3)*1,95=8,1	FA	0,3+0,3=0,6
NNP	4,4+1,8=6,2	AEB	0,1+0,4=0,5
UDM	1,6+0,8=2,4	Azapo	0,1+0,3=0,4
ACDP	1,2+0,6=1,8	CP	0,1+0,3=0,4
PAC	0,2+0,9=1,2	MF	0,1+0,1=0,2

The survey facilitated a breakdown of the characteristics of potential voters for each party. The table that follows indicates the breakdowns by eight ethno-linguistic groupings.

Clearly, the ANC support was very solid amongst non-Zulu blacks. Even amongst isiZulu speakers, almost one in two was a potential ANC voter. It was also strong amongst the coloured group, where almost one in three indicated that they would have voted for the ANC. Amongst whites, the largest groups were those who indicated that they would have voted for the DP. This was a slightly weaker tendency amongst Afrikaans-speaking whites than amongst whites who speak English or other languages, however. For the former group, the NNP also remained a relatively strong option. Amongst coloureds, the NNP competed in a ratio of 2:3 against the ANC. Indians were divided in their loyalties between the DP, the NNP and to a lesser extent, the ANC (Table 9.5).

Table 9.5: Party support by ethno-linguistic grouping, November 1999 (percentages)

Party	Ethno-linguistic group								
	Black Zulu	Black Sotho group	Black Xhosa	Black other	White Afrikaans	White other	Coloured	Indian	Total population
ANC	46,9	83,2	80,3	76,3	0,8	4,6	30,7	8,0	56,1
DP		0,6	0,3	0,6	29,5	46,8	6,6	26,4	6,4
IFP	11,6	0,1	1,0		2,3		0,5	0,8	2,8
NNP		0,2	0,4	1,3	15,8	4,7	19,2	21,3	4,4
UDM	0,1	0,4	5,7	0,6	1,9	1,5	1,5	0,2	1,5
ACDP	0,6	0,1	1,7	1,1	0,9	2,9	2,2	4,0	1,2
FF					6,1	1,8	0,4		0,6
PAC	0,1	0,2	1,2						0,2
CP					0,7	0,6			0,1
FA				0,2	2,6	1,2		0,5	0,3
Azapo				0,6			0,1		0,1
SACP							0,1		0,0
UCDP		0,9	0,2	0,3		0,9			0,3
Other				0,7		0,5	0,7		0,6
Won't vote	7,0	4,9	1,7	8,0	4,8	3,2	7,9	12,0	5,8
Don't know	5,7	4,8	2,5	5,0	10,9	6,1	12,1	8,2	6,0
Uncertain	8,5	1,5	0,8	4,7	13,1	17,6	11,3	5,8	6,2
Refused	19,4	3,1	4,2	0,7	10,6	7,7	6,6	10,2	7,6
Total	20,6				7,8	4,9	9,7	0,7	

9.3 Reasons for voting preferences

It should not be presumed that voters automatically vote for parties that are perceived to represent their particular population, ethnic or linguistic group. The survey indicates that motivations for voting for a particular party were not overtly population or ethnicity related. Respondents were asked, “*If you did vote in the 1999 election, for what reason did you choose the party that you did?*” (Table 9.6).

Most responses were related to issues of an improved lifestyle (34%) or to a specific policy (e.g. jobs, housing) of the party concerned (36%). Fewer appeared to identify with the party for less tangible reasons (e.g. trust or belief in the party, like for the party, preference for a good opposition) (22%). Significantly, and as was the case in a Namibian election survey,¹ only 4% gave reasons that suggested overt racial identity as being their voting motivation. Nevertheless, given the apartheid history, it would be surprising if population group or ethnicity had not dictated with which parties most South Africans would identify most closely even if this assumed a subliminal role in determining voting behaviour (Table 9.7).

¹ Keulder, C. (1009), *Voting Behaviour in Namibia: Local Authority Elections 1998*, United States Agency for International Development and Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Windhoek.

Table 9.6: Reason for specific party selection by population group, 1999 election (percentages)

Reason		Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
Improved lifestyle	For a better life in South Africa	17,8	8,1	22,7	38,0	17,6
	For improvement	15,3	11,6	19,1	8,1	15,0
	To make things right	0,9	0,9	0,5	1,6	0,9
	For stability	0,2	0,4	0,0	0,0	0,2
Specific party policy	More jobs	16,6	1,0	8,8	2,7	13,8
	To get a house	8,1	0,0	3,7	0,5	6,6
	School bursaries	0,1				0,1
	Give me land	0,4				0,3
	Good economic policy	1,3	3,7	1,8	0,0	1,6
	Party policy	0,9	7,5	1,4	0,8	1,7
	Visions/solutions	1,1	2,2	0,8	1,5	1,2
	Most realistic		3,5			0,4
	Personal rights	0,4	0,6	0,6	0,7	0,5
	Good promises	4,5	2,4	6,9	1,2	4,4
	Promises not kept	0,3	2,3	1,3	1,3	0,7
	Stop crime/violence	0,3	1,4	3,3	0,8	1,4
	Safer country	0,9	0,8	0,0	0,2	0,8
	Party is liberal	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0
	Increase pension	1,0	0,0	0,6	0,0	0,8
	Party is democratic	1,4	0,5	0,7	0,3	1,2
	Party does not discriminate	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,2
Identifies with specific party	Trust or belief	8,9	12,9	9,7	10,4	9,5
	Right thing	1,1	5,0	5,4	3,4	1,9
	Good/only opposition party	1,1	17,2	1,6	7,2	3,2
	Better than other parties	0,6	5,6	2,0	6,9	1,5
	To give government a chance	1,0	0,8	0,7	1,2	0,9
	To give another party a chance	0,8	0,6	0,1	1,4	0,7
	Like the party	2,6	3,9	1,8	4,6	2,7
	Party represents my needs	1,9	2,3	0,9	1,8	1,8
Racial identity	Give blacks a chance to govern	1,3	0,3	0,0	0,0	1,0
	For all blacks	2,3	0,0	0,7	0,0	1,9
	Party for the nation	0,8	0,9	0,0	0,0	0,7
	Party for whites	0,0	2,2	1,1	1,5	0,4
Other	Was forced to vote	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,7	0,0
	For no reason	1,7	0,0	1,0	0,0	1,4
	Don't know	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,2
	Did not vote	0,4	1,2	1,8	2,5	0,7

Table 9.7: Grouped reasons for party selection by population group, 1999 election (percentages)

Reason category	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
Improved lifestyle	34,2	21,0	42,3	47,7	33,7
Specific party policy	37,5	26,2	29,9	10,0	35,7
Identifies with specific party	18,0	48,3	22,2	36,9	22,2
Racial identity of party	4,4	3,4	1,8	1,5	4,0
Other reasons	1,7	0,0	1,2	0,7	1,6
Did not vote	0,4	1,2	1,8	2,5	0,7

Chapter 10

Institutional trust

Gregory Houston and Stephen Rule

10.1 Trust in institutions

Several items were included in the survey questionnaire to establish the levels of trust that exist in various governmental or civil society institutions. The institutions investigated were the national government, the courts, labour unions, provincial governments, the media, the police, the defence force, political parties, local government, business, churches and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Trust was measured by means of a six-point Likert-type scale with the following dimensions: Strongly trust, trust, neither trust nor distrust, distrust, strongly distrust and don't know. Non-governmental institutions such as the church, the media and — to a lesser extent — business were trusted more by the South African public than most governmental institutions. It is furthermore of interest that business, although often criticised by labour unions and other organisations that are said to represent “the people”, enjoyed relatively high trust among most sub-divisions of the population.

10.2 Trust in institutions by province

Levels of trust for each institution varied by province (Table 10.1). With regard to trust in the national government, the highest level was found for the Eastern Cape and the second highest in the Free State. People in the Western Cape indicated the lowest level of trust in the national government and those in Gauteng, the second lowest. The Free State population expressed the highest level of trust in courts and those in the Western Cape had the lowest. Labour unions enjoyed the highest trust in the Eastern Cape and the lowest in Gauteng. The population of the Free State voiced the highest trust in both their provincial and local government and those of the Eastern Cape the second highest. The lowest levels of trust for provincial and local government occurred in Gauteng and the Western Cape.

Trust in the media was the highest in the Eastern Cape and lowest in the Western Cape. The police enjoyed the highest trust in the Northern Cape and the Free State and the lowest in Gauteng. Trust in the defence force was highest for the Eastern Cape and the lowest in Gauteng. Political parties, the institution that enjoyed the lowest overall level of trust, were least trusted in the Western Cape and most trusted in the Eastern Cape.

The level of trust for business was the highest for the Eastern Cape and ironically, lowest for Gauteng, the commercial heart of the country. Trust in churches was highest in the Eastern, Western and Northern Cape and lowest in Gauteng. The IEC enjoyed the highest levels of trust in the Free State and the second highest in the Eastern Cape. Trust in the IEC was, however, the lowest in Gauteng. It is furthermore of interest that the population of Gauteng indicated the lowest levels or second lowest levels of trust for all the variables considered. Either the lowest or the second lowest mean scores were recorded for the Western Cape for the national government, courts labour unions, the media, the defence force, political parties, local government and the IEC. The population of the Free State (the national government, courts, the provincial government, the police, political parties, local

government, business and the IEC) and the Eastern Cape (the national government, labour unions, the provincial government, the media, political parties, business and the IEC), on the other hand, had either the highest or the second highest trust levels in the majority of institutions considered. The population of KwaZulu-Natal (courts, the media, local government and churches) and the Northern Cape (the police, the defence force, business and churches) each indicated the highest or second highest levels of trust for several institutions.

Table 10.1: Trust or distrust in institutions by province, November 1999

Institution	Level of trust	Province									Total
		EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
National Government	Trust	79	70	49	61	69	59	63	61	41	60
	Distrust	13	17	32	22	16	20	21	20	32	23
Courts	Trust	50	55	32	55	57	50	40	48	40	44
	Distrust	33	23	42	24	26	26	34	33	43	33
Labour unions	Trust	56	37	28	39	36	32	37	34	37	38
	Distrust	17	24	39	24	22	25	22	23	37	27
Provincial government	Trust	62	66	38	51	57	49	47	53	41	50
	Distrust	25	14	31	25	29	20	37	25	32	28
Media	Trust	77	72	56	73	70	57	69	68	52	66
	Distrust	12	10	19	13	14	17	13	11	23	15
Police	Trust	55	64	30	55	41	62	50	49	43	47
	Distrust	36	22	46	28	40	23	35	39	40	37
Defence force	Trust	70	66	48	57	53	69	61	54	50	57
	Distrust	13	17	28	18	24	10	20	27	22	21
Political parties	Trust	61	53	26	32	48	38	45	49	22	39
	Distrust	23	27	43	31	29	30	31	31	53	34
Local government	Trust	58	63	34	52	52	48	51	51	39	48
	Distrust	32	20	39	25	36	27	37	31	35	32
Business	Trust	71	61	43	57	56	45	61	53	45	55
	Distrust	11	16	25	14	18	23	20	17	12	17
Churches	Trust	88	84	69	78	86	89	84	85	90	80
	Distrust	7	6	9	7	4	3	7	6	5	7
IEC	Trust	72	72	32	47	67	56	67	59	52	54
	Distrust	14	7	22	15	14	13	12	18	20	16

10.3 Demographic indicators of institutional trust

Table 10.2 lists the proportions of each population group who indicated trust or distrust in each institution. Population group was identified as the most important indicator of trust or distrust for all the institutions investigated, both governmental and non-governmental. Apart from population group and the province in which the population lived, income levels appeared to influence levels of trust, especially in respect of courts, labour unions, provincial governments, the media, the police, the defence force and local governments. Categories of age were significant in the case of labour unions, the defence force, business and the IEC, whereas gender was only significant with regard to trust in churches.

In terms of population group, black people indicated the highest level of trust in most institutions. Only in the case of the police and churches were the levels of trust amongst coloureds slightly higher than those amongst blacks. The black population as a group had the highest level of trust in churches, the media and the national government. They had the least trust in the police, political parties, courts and labour unions.

Trust levels for the coloured population were also higher than those of Indians and whites, for most of the institutions investigated. Only in the case of business were levels of

trust amongst whites higher than those amongst coloureds (but still lower than those for blacks). Similarly to black people and the total sample, coloured people had the highest trust in churches, but indicated the second and third highest levels of trust in the IEC and the defence force. It is furthermore of interest that they indicated the lowest level of trust in political parties, while their trust in provincial and local governments was also relatively low.

Apart from business for which trust amongst whites was the second highest, Indians and whites expressed the lowest levels of trust in all the institutions investigated. Indians had higher trust in the national government, courts, labour unions, the media, the police, political parties and the IEC than did white people. The opposite was true for provincial governments, the defence force, local governments, business and churches, in which whites had higher trust than Indians. The Indian population had the highest trust in churches, business and the defence force. On the other hand, there was an almost 5:1 ratio between those who distrusted and those who trusted political parties. The white population also had the highest trust in churches. The only other institution for which their trust was relatively high was business. They had the least trust in labour unions.

Table 10.2: Level of trust (%) in institutions by population group, Nov. 1999

Institution	Level of trust	Population group				Total
		Black	White	Coloured	Indian	
National government	Trust	71	19	42	32	60
	Distrust	15	59	28	51	23
Courts	Trust	50	22	38	30	44
	Distrust	29	58	33	45	33
Labour unions	Trust	42	10	39	36	38
	Distrust	20	67	26	45	27
Provincial government	Trust	56	25	38	25	50
	Distrust	22	49	31	55	28
Media	Trust	74	38	50	49	66
	Distrust	10	38	17	33	15
Police	Trust	49	37	51	45	47
	Distrust	36	43	31	42	37
Defence force	Trust	62	27	57	50	57
	Distrust	18	41	15	27	21
Political parties	Trust	48	22	24	15	39
	Distrust	16	70	45	69	34
Local government	Trust	55	21	38	25	48
	Distrust	28	51	34	59	32
Business	Trust	57	50	42	58	55
	Distrust-	17	20	15	27	17
Churches	Trust	81	81	81	66	80
	Distrust	7	8	2	12	7
IEC	Trust	60	24	52	46	54
	Distrust	10	48	13	34	16

10.4 Institutional trust by personal income level

A general trend that could be observed was that trust for the majority of institutions investigated was the highest for the lower income groups and that it declined steadily as income increased. This tendency was most conspicuous with regard to trust in the national government, but a similar trend can be observed for courts, labour unions, provincial governments, the police, political parties, local government and the IEC. It is furthermore noteworthy that the people who reported that they had no income revealed the highest levels of trust in almost all the institutions considered. The tendency of declining trust with increasing levels of income did not apply to the media, business and churches to the same extent, as was the case with other institutions.

Table 10.3: Level of trust (%) in institutions by income, November 1999

Institution	Level of trust	Income							Total
		None	R1-R579	R580-R2499	R2500-R5829	R5830-R12499	R12500-R24999	R25000 +	
National Government	Trust	63	70	59	29	29	38	23	60
	Distrust	24	11	23	48	48	50	57	23
Courts	Trust	47	50	41	21	25	35	23	44
	Distrust	32	25	36	56	56	52	77	33
Labour unions	Trust	40	35	45	35	28	14	0	38
	Distrust	25	17	29	48	51	83	100	27
Provincial government	Trust	52	57	49	21	32	32	23	50
	Distrust	28	19	26	56	45	56	77	28
Media	Trust	70	69	68	47	49	59	59	66
	Distrust	16	8	14	31	24	38	21	15
Police	Trust	47	52	47	38	40	40	2	47
	Distrust	37	30	38	44	40	26	98	37
Defence force	Trust	59	59	62	41	34	17	2	57
	Distrust	20	16	19	31	31	60	57	21
Political parties	Trust	41	46	38	16	13	29	21	39
	Distrust	35	22	34	64	67	59	77	34
Local government	Trust	50	57	44	24	27	43	25	48
	Distrust	33	21	33	57	54	51	75	32
Business	Trust	55	54	54	52	49	66	59	55
	Distrust	17	16	17	19	16	23	0	17
Churches	Trust	82	80	82	85	79	64	57	80
	Distrust	7	5	7	7	8	18	21	7
IEC	Trust	57	58	49	42	38	46	21	54
	Distrust	14	9	15	38	42	49	59	16

10.5 Summary

Of all governmental institutions, the national government enjoyed the highest levels of trust. However, whereas trust in churches was relatively unanimous, there was greater variation in opinion with regard and to support for the national government. This can be deduced from relatively large standard deviations, but also because the national government was not one of the three most trusted institutions for smaller groups such as whites and Indians. In fact, no governmental institution was among the most trusted institutions for whites, who gave preference to churches, business and the media. Indians listed only the defence force (as a governmental institution) among their three most trusted institutions. The conclusion can be drawn that levels of trust in governmental institutions — and especially in the various levels

of government — were fairly low among smaller groups within the population. Churches were identified in both surveys as the most trusted institution in South Africa. Whereas the IEC had the second highest mean score in March 1999, the media was rated the second most trusted institution in November 1999. The prominent role that the IEC played during the period prior to the general election probably enhanced its image among the South African public. However, after the election, awareness of the role of the IEC — and consequently also trust in the IEC as an institution — has dwindled. On the other hand, the role of the media in keeping the public informed has seemingly won them the trust of the South African public. The national government was identified as the third most trusted institution in both surveys. Other institutions that apparently enjoyed relatively high trust among South Africans were business and the defence force.

In March 1999 the lowest level of trust was found for labour unions and the second lowest for political parties. These two institutions changed places in the November 1999 survey, when the lowest level of trust was expressed for political parties and the second lowest level for labour unions. It can thus be deduced that trust in political parties had deteriorated in the aftermath of the 1999 general election. Political parties were not the only institution that lost a degree of esteem in the eyes of the South African public. Lower levels of trust were found in the November survey to exist for the national government, courts, the police, the defence force, local government, business, churches and — as already mentioned — the IEC. However, in the case of courts, the police, the defence force, political parties and local governments the proportional differences between the two surveys were too small for it to be concluded that trust in these institutions had indeed deteriorated. Labour unions, provincial governments and the media had, on the other hand, gained some esteem.

Of particular interest furthermore is the fact that, despite differences in trust in the institutions investigated, it appears as if most people tended to generalise attitudes about one institution to most other institutions. A sharp distinction is not even drawn between governmental and non-governmental institutions. This conclusion is based on the fact that groups or categories that indicated high trust in one institution also indicated relatively high levels of trust in most of the other institutions. The opposite was also true. Groups or categories that had low levels of trust in an institution such as the national government, also had relatively low levels of trust in other institutions. The only exception was churches, which appeared to enjoy high levels of trust among most groups and categories.

Chapter 11

Crime

Richard Humphries

This chapter reports on the survey results of various questions dealing with crime that were put to respondents of the November 1999 national survey. The questions revolved around general perceptions of the crime situation and their experience with crime during the preceding 12 months. The results are analysed in terms of various variables, notably province, population group, income, gender and age. It is important to note that the responses will be analysed in the order they were asked in the questionnaire. The core questions have remained the same over various HSRC surveys, allowing a measure of longitudinal analysis of national opinion on these issues. The November 1999 results will however be mostly compared with those from December 1998.

11.1 Perceptions of safety

The first question to probe attitudes towards crime issues was that of “How safe or unsafe do you personally feel on most days?” The responses show that national opinion is almost evenly balanced between those respondents who reported feeling safe or not safe. Some 44% said they felt either safe or very safe, slightly lower than the 47% of respondents who said they felt unsafe or very unsafe “on most days”. These figures show little change from December 1998 when the national aggregates for these categories were 43% and 49% respectively.

When analysed by other variables the results show some interesting points. In the first place, the survey showed that there was no difference between male and female respondents on their feelings of personal safety. Given the high levels of crime in the country, and extensive publicity around women being the victims of domestic violence and rape, a working hypothesis of this point would probably have expected women to hold higher levels of insecurity than men. But, as will be shown below, women are less likely to suffer from crime than men. Secondly, the age of respondents also generally made no meaningful differences to their attitudes on this point.

Differences are however important when variables of income, population group and province are analysed. Respondents with an income between R1 250 and R8 329 per month report somewhat higher levels of insecurity than those falling outside of these margins. In the case of those respondents earning between R4 160 and R8 329 it varies between 53% and 60%, against the national average of 47%. Not surprisingly respondents in the highest income bracket (above R16 660 per month) report the lowest levels of insecurity. This is arguably the result of these respondents being able to afford significant higher levels of private security protection than other South Africans. Population group differences are stark. Indians are the most insecure about their personal safety (69%), followed by whites (59%), Blacks (45%) and coloureds (41%).

Provincial differences are also important, as Table 11.1 illustrates. Respondents living in the Free State and Gauteng report much higher feelings of safety than those living in Mpumalanga (30%), Northern Cape (37%), Western Cape (40%) and the North West (41%). Two comments can be made on these figures. First, the extremely low figure of personal safety recorded by respondents in Mpumalanga seems unexpected — at least compared to Gauteng and Western Cape which SAPS figures generally record as having the highest crime rates of all provinces. Second, the Western Cape response, already low and matching its high crime rate, was recorded before the holiday season terror blasts. Subsequent polls might well show the impact of these blasts, especially if they continue sporadically during the year.

Table 11.1 Perceptions of safety by province, November 1999 (percentages)

Perceptions of safety	Province								
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC
Safe	45	60	37	47	30	59	51	41	40
Neither	3	5	11	7	7	10	3	8	14
Unsafe	52	34	48	46	63	31	46	51	46

How compatible are the November 1999 responses with those recorded in the December 1998 survey? The surveys reveal rather wide swings in perceptions over the period than a consistency in rankings between the provinces. The swings could be affected by a number of factors — including changes in perceptions in police performance in the different provinces to the localised effects of crime in communities sampled by the survey.

11.2 Perceptions of government control over crime

Respondents were then asked for their opinion on the extent to which government had control or not over the crime situation. The responses show that just under one in ten persons (9%) believed that the government “has full control”; that five out of ten (49%) believed that the government had either “small” or “large” control and that just under four out of ten persons (35%) believed that the government was “not in control”. The remaining 7% of the sample said they did not know.

When compared with the December 1998 survey, these responses suggest a substantial improvement in perceptions by South Africans towards the government’s handling of crime. The December 1998 survey provided figures of 5% for “full control”; 41% for “small to large control” and 51% for no control at all. Corroboration of this point is also provided by the 10% fall in respondents pointing to crime as a major national priority, as reported in Chapter 3 of this report.

These positive assessments are reflected across all population groups, even though large majorities of whites and Indians still remain convinced that the government is not in control of the crime situation. The number of whites holding this attitude dropped from 88% to 75% while amongst Indians it dropped from 79% to 68%, and amongst blacks it dropped from 37% in December 1998 to 26% a year later.

The explanations for this improvement in attitudes probably hinge on voter perceptions of the actions of the new Minister for Safety and Security, Mr. Steve Tshwete. Since his appointment in June 1999, he has adopted a high profile, tough stance towards crime issues, which clearly finds favour with South Africans. Voters would seem to expect him to deliver either a holding down, if not a reduction, in crime rates.

Provincial variations in responses to this question remain important even allowing for the improvement in perceptions noted above. The majority of respondents in the Western Cape continue to believe the government has no control (dropping from 68% in December 1998 to 54% in November 1999) while respondents in the Free State remain the most positive towards the government on this score (increasing from 12% to 19% in the same period).

Table 11.2: Perceptions of government control by province, November 1999 (percentages)

Control	Province								
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC
Full control	10	19	7	6	9	9	16	10	3
Some control	63	47	42	61	43	48	41	49	37
No control	24	29	47	21	44	33	34	33	54

11.3 Experiences of crime

The third question posed to respondents concerned their experiences with crime in the 12 months preceding the survey. Since the November 1999 survey was the first survey to ask this question, no longitudinal analysis is possible on this particular point. Future surveys will track victimisation rates in a consistent manner.

Respondents were asked whether they personally had been victims of crime during the last 12 months and, if so, how many times they had been a victim. The results show that one in five respondents reported being a victim during the time period. Table 11.3 presents the results on the basis of gender of respondents.

Table 11.3: Victimization experiences by gender, November 1999 (percentages)*

Frequency	Male	Female	Total
Not once	74	84	81
One	15	10	12
Twice	5	4	4
Three times	3	2	2
Four times	1	0.3	1
Five times	1	0.7	1

* Figures rounded except for rates below 1%. This account for columns not adding up to 100% in all cases.

When analysed by population group, distinct differences emerge between the four population groups. White and Indian respondents report substantially higher victimisation rates than black or coloured respondents. Victimization rates also generally rise with the income of respondents; the highest rate for persons reporting being a victim of crime once in the preceding 12 months was 24% for those earning between R4 160 and R16 659 per month persons falling between 35 and 54 years also experience the highest victimisation rates, at 14% for those reporting a single crime in the preceding year. Table 11.4 illustrates the experiences of respondents in the different population groups.

Table 11.4: Victimization experiences by population group, November 1999 (percentages)*

Frequency	Black	White	Coloureds	Indians
Not once	84	61	82	68
One	11	19	10	15
Twice	4	6	5	7
Three times	1	7	3	5
Four times	0,4	2	0,6	3
Five times	0,4	5	-	2

* Figures rounded, except for rates below 1%. This accounts for columns not adding up to 100% in all cases.

Respondents in the Free State and the Northern Province report the lowest victimisation rates, closely followed by the Northern Cape. On the other hand, those in Gauteng report the highest, followed by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The table illustrates the variations between provinces.

Table 11.5: Victimization experiences by province, November 1999 (percentages)*

Frequency	Province								
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC
Not once	81	91	74	76	83	87	90	86	78
One	13	6	16	12	12	6	6	10	11
Twice	3	3	5	8	2	5	3	2	5
Three times	2	1	3	1	2	2	0,3	2	4
Four times	-	-	1	1	0,2	0,3	0,3	-	2
Five times	1	0,2	1	1	-	-	-	0,7	2

* Figures rounded, except for rates below 1%. This accounts for columns not adding up to 100% in all cases.

11.4 Is there a consistent inter-provincial pattern to perceptions and experiences of crime?

This chapter has presented responses to three questions surveying perceptions of various crime issues. This final section concludes by ordering the responses to the questions on the basis of the provincial variable. The provinces are ranked according to the degree to which respondents in each province report the greatest negative perceptions of each of the three crime questions posed to them.

Table 11.6: Provincial rankings

Province	Feel unsafe		Feel govt. is not in control		Victimisation experiences	
	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank
EC	51	2	24	8	19	4
FS	34	8	29	7	9	9
GT	49	4	47	2	26	1
KN	47	5	21	9	24	2
MP	61	1	44	3	17	5
NC	31	9	33	6	13	7
NP	44	7	34	4	10	8
NW	51	3	34	5	14	6
WC	46	6	54	1	22	3

The rankings are done to reflect on the extent to which actual experience of crime in the different provinces lead to consistent negative perceptions of personal safe and government control. The data suggests that there is no perfect match between actual experiences and perceptions in all nine provinces across the three issues.

For example, respondents in Mpumalanga have the highest “unsafe” ranking and another high ranking for lack of government control over crime; but they are a long way off being the province with the highest victimisation rate. Similarly, respondents in KwaZulu-Natal experience high crime rates (second on the ranking) but, in effect, report the most positive perceptions towards government control over crime.

But while there might be no close match between perceptions and experiences in every province, the data does show some broadly consistent patterns within provinces across each question. This is particularly the case with respect to Gauteng, Western Cape, the Free State and to a slightly lesser extent in the case of the Northern Cape, Northern Province and the North West.

Chapter 12

Geographical preferences and movements

Stephen Rule

This chapter deals with the geographical preferences and recent migration patterns of respondents. They were asked in which province they would most like to live and, if they had moved in the preceding 12 months, where they had lived before.

12.1 Provincial preferences

The respondents were asked to indicate in which province of South Africa they would most like to live. Although the responses to this question do not necessarily signify the intention either to remain in a province or to move to another, they do give an indication of public perceptions and sentiment about the provinces in South Africa. The weighted survey responses by province are listed in Table 12.1.

Table 12.1: Most preferred province by current province, November 1999 (%)

Current province	Province preferred									Total
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
Eastern Cape	87	1	3	2	0	0	0	0	7	14
Free state	0	90	2	2	1	0	0	2	3	7
Gauteng	3	1	72	7	3	2	5	1	6	22
Kwa-Zulu Natal	4	0	4	87	2	0	0	0	3	18
Mpumalanga	0	0	5	1	89	1	1	3	0	7
Northern Cape	1	1	3	1	0	82	0	3	9	2
Northern Province	0	0	7	1	3	0	85	3	1	10
North West	0	0	8	0	1	1	1	88	1	9
Western Cape	3	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	95	11
Total	14	6	19	18	8	2	10	9	14	100

Two striking features emerge in the pattern of responses:

- Most of the respondents (85%) wanted to live in the provinces where they were living at the time of the survey in November 1999; and
- The level of satisfaction with living in some provinces was significantly higher than in others.


The degree of satisfaction with one's home province was highest in the Western Cape (95%). Five provinces followed closely in the 87-90% range, namely the Free State, Mpumalanga, North West, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. Marginally behind them were the Northern Province (85%) and the Northern Cape (82%). Most noticeable was the lower level of situational satisfaction in Gauteng (72%). The Gauteng figure implies that three out of ten adults would rather have been living in another province.

Inter-provincial comparisons were facilitated by the computation of an index of relative residential preference for each province. The index used here is simply the quotient of the proportion of respondents who would like to live in a province (including those who already live there) and those who do live in that province, multiplied by 100. Again, the Western Cape comes out on top by a large margin. This indicates that not only were the vast majority of Western Cape respondents satisfied with living there, but also a large proportion of respondents living in other provinces expressed the wish to live in the Western Cape. In terms of absolute numbers, the majority of respondents not living in the Western Cape who would have liked to be living there were living in Gauteng or the Eastern Cape at the time of the survey.

Gauteng registered the lowest residential satisfaction index. Large proportions of Gauteng respondents indicated that they would have liked to be living in KwaZulu-Natal (7%), the Western Cape (6%) or the Northern Province (5%). Nevertheless, the largest proportion of all the respondents nationally (19%) indicated that they would most like to be living in Gauteng. Most of the non-Gautengers who preferred to live in Gauteng were living in the Northern Province, KwaZulu-Natal, North West and the Eastern Cape (Table 12.1).

Table 12.2: Indices of residential preference for each province, November 1999

Province	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC
Preference index	99	96	87	98	112	114	97	100	125



The average age of those who would have preferred to live in another province (29 years) was somewhat younger than that of those who preferred the province in which they lived (38 years). Those who preferred another province were more likely than those who preferred to remain in their current province to have completed a minimum of matric (22% compared with 8%) and to be in one of the top three living standard measure (LSM) categories (48% compared with only 33%). Perceived financial circumstances did not seem

to play a role in whether or not the respondents would prefer to have been in another province. More than half of both those who preferred their current provinces (53%) and those who preferred another province (54%) indicated that the financial situations of their households had worsened during the past 12 months.

Fewer of the group who would have preferred to live in another province (41%) than those who preferred their home province (55%) were satisfied with the way South Africa was being governed. A larger proportion of white respondents (30%) than black respondents (14%) would have preferred to live in another province. An even smaller proportion of coloured (9%) and especially Indian respondents (2%) preferred to remain living in the province they lived in at the time of the survey. Six specific categories made up the majority of the 15% of respondents who indicated that they would most like to have been living elsewhere. The categories and their preferred provinces of residence were:

- Gautengs who would like to live in KwaZulu-Natal (half of them were black isiZulu speakers in LSM groups 3-5 and a quarter were whites in LSM groups 7-8)
- Gautengs who would like to live in the Western Cape (predominantly whites in LSM groups 7-8)
- Gautengs who would like to live in the Northern Province (mainly blacks in LSM groups 4-6 and speakers of Xitsonga and Tshivenda)
- Eastern Cape respondents who would prefer to be in the Western Cape (mainly isiXhosa speakers in LSM groups 2-7 and younger than 35 years)
- Northern Province respondents who would rather live in Gauteng (speakers of Sepedi, Xitsonga or Tshivenda in LSM groups 2-5)
- KwaZulu-Natal respondents whose province of preference is Gauteng (mainly isiZulu speakers, LSM groups 2-6, 30% with no personal income)

In addition, there were pockets of black respondents in Gauteng who expressed preferences for the Northern Province and the Eastern Cape.

The respondents were not asked to give reasons for their preferences but it is likely that economic factors and the desire to be closer to their extended families play an important role.

As indicated above, these opinions constituted preferences and not necessarily indications of intended moves. The section that follows examines the extent to which the respondents had indeed moved during the year preceding the survey.

12.2 Migration tendencies

The respondents were asked to indicate whether they had actually moved to a new home during the 12 months before the November 1999 survey. One-twelfth (8%) indicated that they had moved during this period. This proportion was higher among the current residents of the Western Cape (11%) and Gauteng (10%) than those in the other seven provinces. The lowest level of mobility during the period in question was in Mpumalanga and North West, where only 5% indicated that they had moved (Table 12.3).

The previous locations of those who had moved were primarily (73%) within the same province in which they lived at the time of the survey. About one-quarter (25%) had moved from another province and 2% from beyond the borders of South Africa.

The largest *absolute* flow of movers was within or to Gauteng. More than one-third of this group (35%) had come from other provinces, primarily KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and the Free State.

The provinces that received the largest *relative* inflows from other provinces were:

- (i) the Northern Cape (67% of those who had moved to a new home in the province), mainly from Gauteng and the Western Cape; and
- (ii) North West (48% of those who had moved), mainly from Gauteng and the Northern Cape.

Table 12.3: Previous home province of respondents who moved during the year ending November 1999

	Current home province (% who moved during past 12 months)									Total
	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC	
	7	6	10	8	5	9	7	5	11	8
Previous home province of those who moved										
Eastern Cape	84	3	4	5	0	11	0	0	12	14
Free state	0	66	7	2	0	0	0	7	0	6
Gauteng	0	6	65	3	12	33	11	17	0	22
KwaZulu-Natal	0	0	7	79	0	0	0	0	4	17
Mpumalanga	0	0	7	0	88	0	5	0	0	6
Northern Cape	0	0	0	0	0	33	0	16	2	2
Northern Province	10	13	4	0	0	0	82	0	0	11
North West	0	0	4	5	0	5	0	53	0	4
Western Cape	6	0	0	5	0	18	0	7	82	16
Outside South Africa	0	12	2	1	0	0	2	0	0	2

Examining the responses by racial disaggregation, it is evident that whites (12%) and coloureds (11%) showed double the rate of blacks (7%) and Indians (6%) for moving in the past 12 months.

Appendix 1

Weighted demographic & socio-economic characteristics of survey sample

Province	EC	FS	GT	KN	MP	NC	NP	NW	WC
%	13,7	6,7	21,5	19,0	6,8	2,1	10,2	8,6	11,5

Race	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
%	74,4	12,7	9,7	3,2

Most frequently spoken language	%
isiZulu	20,8
isiXhosa	17,0
Afrikaans	14,1
English	10,3
Setswana	9,4
Sesotho	7,9
Sepedi	7,8
Xitsonga	3,7
siSwati	3,2
Tshivenda/Lemba	2,5
isiNdebele	1,4
Indian languages	0,9
Afrikaans & English	0,6
Other African languages	0,4
European languages	0,1

Ethno-linguistic category	%
Black Zulu	20,7
Black Sotho group	17,8
Black Xhosa	16,8
Black other	19,2
Coloured	9,7
White Afrikaans	7,7
White other	4,9
Indian	3,2

Age group	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+
%	20,7	24,5	19,2	13,1	22,5

Gender	Male	Female
%	37,2	62,8

Education completed	None	Grade 1-7	Grade 8-11	Grade 12	Diploma	Degree
%	11,6	24,8	35,9	17,4	7,5	2,9
		24,8	3	17,4	7,5,2,9	

Living Standard Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
%	1,6	9,1	15,4	19,5	19,4	11,7	10,9	12,3

Marital status	%
Civil marriage, children	21,3
Civil marriage, no children	2,1
Traditional marriage, children	10,2
Traditional marriage, no children	1,2
Civil & traditional marriage, children	3,7
Civil & traditional marriage, no children	0,7
Betrothed, children	1,4
Betrothed, no children	0,4
Living together, children	2,4
Living together, no children	1,3
Divorced, children	3,5
Divorced, no children	0,8
Widowed, children	8,9
Widowed, no children	2,8
Never married, children	19,8
Never married, no children	19,7

Gross monthly income	% personal	% household
None	42,4	4,1
R1-R249	7,5	8,0
R250-R579	20,4	22,8
R580-R1249	8,3	20,2
R1250-R2499	8,1	14,0
R2500-R4159	3,6	8,6
R4160-R8329	4,2	7,1
R8330-R16659	1,6	5,0
R16660-R41660+	0,5	2,1
Refused to answer	2,7	2,6
Uncertain/don't know	0,7	5,6

Employment status	%
Employed full time	17,8
Self-employed full time	4,2
Employed part time	4,7
Self-employed part time	2,6
Informal sector	0,9
Pensioner	16,0
Student	10,3
Housewife not looking for work	5,2
Housewife looking for work	1,7
Informal sector looking for work	1,9
Unemployed looking for work	27,0
Unemployed	7,8

Religious affiliation	%
Roman Catholic	8,0
Zionist Christian Church (Z.C.C.)	7,6
Methodist Church of South Africa	7,4
Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa	6,9
Other Zionist churches	5,7
Church of the Province of Southern Africa (Anglican)	5,4
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk	5,1
Lutheran Evangelical	3,8
Old Apostolic Church	3,4
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika	2,3
Other Independent Black churches	2,2
New Apostolic Church	2,2
Assemblies of God	2,1
Islam	2,0
Full Gospel Church	2,0
Presbyterian en Church	1,8
African Methodist Episcopal Church	1,6
Pentecostal churches	1,6
Ethiopian Christian Church	1,6
Hindu	1,5
Baptist Church	1,3
Shembe Church	1,2
United Congregational Church of South Africa	1,2
Reformed churches	1,2
Church of England in South Africa	1,1
Other religious groupings	9,5
None	10,2
Refuse to answer	0,3
Don't know	0,8

Media	Daily newspaper reading	Daily television watching						
		<1 hour	1-2 hours	2-3 hours	3-4 hours	>4 hours	Never watch	Don't have TV
%	35,9	18,5	26,1	14,1	9,3	12,6	9,5	9,8

Communications	Working telephone	Computer			Cellphone		Cellphone in household			
		Personal	Business	Both	Personal	Business	Both	Personal	Business	Both
%	31,2	4,7	0,8	2,0	7,1	0,3	1,7	5,2	1,9	2,5

Appendix 2

Geographical distribution of sampled enumerator areas

FREE STATE (30)			EASTERN CAPE (35)			MPUMALANGA (30)		
EA	LS	District	EA	LS	District	EA	LS	District
4100018	4	Bultfontein	2170008	4	Stutterheim	8250191	1	Nkomazi
4166004	4	Parys	2296013	4	Cradock	8260461	1	Nsikazi
4390004	4	Philippolis	2190352	5	East London	8050027	3	Piet Retief
4456085	4	Bloemfontein	2170082	6	Stutterheim	8150107	3	Middelburg
4456332	4	Bloemfontein	2190369	7	East London	8180051	3	Moutse
4086077	5	Welkom	2380130	10	Humansdorp	8240146	3	Eerstehoek
4090017	5	Bothaville	2190159	11	East London	8260061	3	Nsikazi
4066114	6	Odendaalsrus	2400467	12	Port Elizabeth	8260376	3	Nsikazi
4086267	6	Welkom	2416171	12	Uitenhage	8270035	3	Mdutjana
4170024	6	Theunissen	2400266	15	Port Elizabeth	8280244	3	Mkobola
4230073	6	Ficksburg	2400284	16	Port Elizabeth	8300167	3	KwaMhlanga
4300003	6	Vrede	2070019	18	Barkly East	8260055	5	Nsikazi
4506108	6	Sasolburg	2400329	18	Port Elizabeth	8300382	5	KwaMhlanga
4526325	6	Witsieshoek	2400167	19	Port Elizabeth	8020048	6	Bethal
4526600	6	Witsieshoek	2150035	20	Queenstown	8060103	6	Standerton
4220117	7	Bethlehem	2190600	21	East London	8110339	6	Hoëveldrif
4500079	7	Sasolburg	2406182	21	Port Elizabeth	8170500	6	Witbank
4070210	8	Virginia	2406486	21	Port Elizabeth	8250154	6	Nkomazi
4170058	8	Theunissen	2420176	21	Mdantsane	8110190	7	Hoëveldrif
4120015	9	Hennenman	2430196	21	Zwelitsha	8170410	7	Witbank
4070001	18	Virginia	2440157	21	Hewu	8210120	7	Nelspruit
4220008	18	Bethlehem	2490184	21	Peddie	8140045	8	Groblersdal
4300038	18	Vrede	2510147	21	Butterworth	8150068	12	Middelburg
4450207	18	Bloemfontein	2530509	21	Engcobo	8060038	14	Standerton
4080070	19	Welkom	2560066	21	Kentani	8060031	18	Standerton
4450129	19	Bloemfontein	2580156	21	Lusikisiki	8150230	18	Middelburg
4230048	22	Ficksburg	2590250	21	Maluti	8200001	18	Lydenburg
4446087	22	Botshabelo	2616023	21	Mt. Fletcher	8050003	19	Piet Retief
4446331	22	Botshabelo	2640046	21	Ngqueleni	8170036	19	Witbank
4510140	22	Thaba Nchu	2660120	21	Port St Johns	8310081	23	Moretele
			2690104	21	Tabankulu			
			2720018	21	Umtata			
			2720725	21	Umtata			
			2750317	21	Lady Frere			
			2770137	21	Umzimkulu			

NORTHERN CAPE (31)

EA	LS	District
3150114	4	Gordonia
3230071	4	Postmasburg
3210033	5	Kimberley
3200015	6	Warrenton
3180042	7	Hartswater
3010024	10	Namaqualand
3020027	10	Calvinia
3120009	10	Noupoort

GAUTENG (55)

EA	LS	District
7010616	3	Pretoria
7030143	3	Wonderboom
7066313	3	Alberton
7076142	3	Benoni
7086069	3	Boksburg
7106246	3	Kempton Park
7116153	3	Brakpan
7186220	3	Roodepoort

NORTHERN PROVINCE (31)

EA	LS	District	EA	LS	District			
3150157	10	Gordonia	7246395	3	Soweto	9110125	1	Malamulele
3150200	10	Gordonia	7246828	3	Soweto	9140087	1	Mhala
3210138	10	Kimberley	7247255	3	Soweto	9150043	1	Ritavi
3010074	11	Namaqualand	7247650	3	Soweto	9160412	1	Giyani
3090038	11	De Aar	7056076	5	Randburg	9190024	1	Sekgosese
3150051	11	Gordonia	7066937	5	Alberton	9210053	1	Mokerong
3170003	11	Barkly West	7136072	5	Nigel	9210652	1	Mokerong
3230036	11	Postmasburg	7196027	5	Westonaria	9220522	1	Seshego
3010156	12	Namaqualand	7236234	5	Vanderbijlpark	9230437	1	Thabamoopo
3210085	12	Kimberley	7236713	5	Vanderbijlpark	9240189	1	Nebo
3090027	16	De Aar	7050467	7	Randburg	9250166	1	Sekhukhuneland
3150009	17	Gordonia	7200024	7	Bronkhorstsprt	9250849	1	Sekhukhuneland
3010144	18	Namaqualand	7011467	8	Pretoria	9270124	1	Mapulaneng
3090008	18	De Aar	7041683	8	Johannesburg	9100014	3	Warmbad
3170004	18	Barkly West	7100223	8	Kempton Park	9060119	5	Potgietersrus
3200028	18	Warrenton	7190038	8	Westonaria	9220703	6	Seshego
3230014	18	Postmasburg	7040640	9	Johannesburg	9010082	7	Letaba
3210023	19	Kimberley	7041383	11	Johannesburg	9060031	7	Potgietersrus
3216013	19	Kimberley	7041351	12	Johannesburg	9090051i	7	Thabazimbi
3010014	22	Namaqualand	7196115	13	Westonaria	9060001	8	Potgietersrus
3216055	22	Kimberley	7010777	14	Pretoria	9090015	8	Thabazimbi
3216101	22	Kimberley	7040568	14	Johannesburg	9160004	9	Giyani
3216145	22	Kimberley	7041427	14	Johannesburg	9030010	18	Phalaborwa
			7041442	14	Johannesburg	9070022	18	Waterberg
			7041458	14	Johannesburg	9040019	19	Pietersburg
			7060151	14	Alberton	9220514	22	Seshego
			7130075	14	Nigel	9280267	22	Dzanani
			7196187	14	Westonaria	9300053	22	Tohoyandou
			7220308	14	Vereeniging	9300357	22	Tohoyandou
			7226445	14	Vereeniging	9300692	22	Tohoyandou
			7010151	16	Pretoria	9310293	22	Vumani
			7040496	16	Johannesburg			
			7041191	16	Johannesburg			
			7011257	17	Pretoria			
			7060028	18	Alberton			
			7160048	18	Oberholzer			
			7230067	18	Vanderbijlpark			
			7010034	19	Pretoria			
			7010978	19	Pretoria			
			7030578	19	Wonderboom			
			7100019	19	Kempton Park			
			7150109	19	Krugersdorp			

